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“There are districts in which the position of the  
rural population is that of a man standing permanently  
up to the neck in water, so that even a ripple  
is sufficient to drown him.” (Tawney 1966:77)  
 iv
Abstract 
This master thesis investigates the welfare effects for bonded laborers (kamaiyas) in 
Western Terai of a ban on permanent labor contracts in July 2000. The ban was 
credibly enforced and within a short time the number of bonded laborers was reduced 
significantly.  
  
By and large the bonded labor institution in this region must be seen as a voluntary 
agreement whereby a risk averse worker entered into an annual labor contract with a 
risk neutral landlord. The contract provided a fixed income which smoothed 
consumption for the worker, who thereby avoided exposure to an unpredictable labor 
market for casual workers. The kamaiya worker received other benefits as well, such 
as housing, food and access to credit. However, the working hours for kamaiyas were 
very long.  
 
The former kamaiyas may be divided into two groups, those who have become 
sharecroppers and those who work as casual laborers. The bonded labor contracts have 
mainly been replaced by sharecropping. Both groups have in common that their annual 
income has become more volatile since 2000. However, I argue that both groups have 
become better off. The reason is that the ban on bonded labor has increased the wage 
level for casual workers in villages with a high presence of kamaiyas, which implies 
that the outside option of former kamaiyas has increased. I also argue that 
sharecropping is a more efficient institution than the kamaiya labor system.  
 v
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Bonded Labor – Global and Historical Context 
Bonded labor in agricultural economies is an ancient economic institution which is still 
observed in parts of the developing world. This institution chiefly focuses on poor workers 
indebted to their employer. They pay their debt through long-term servitude with limited 
compensation, often under harsh working conditions. Bonded labor arrangements show a 
decreasing global trend (Ray 1998:505), but in 1998 the United Nations Working Group on 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery estimated that some 20 million people worldwide were still 
engaged in labor practices involving debt bondage (UN 1998). In 2005, the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) estimated that at least 12.3 million people could be characterized as 
unfree labor (ILO 2005). This estimate is far from flawless, as a precise definition of bonded 
labor has not been universally agreed. Bonded labor is recognized by the UN as a 
contemporary form of slavery, alongside trafficking and sexual slavery. 
 
Bonded labor in the agricultural sector is considered to be especially common in South Asia, 
particularly in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Nepal. While these countries officially 
recognize that bonded labor is still in practise, its magnitude is disputed. Typically, estimates 
made by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) tend to exceed those provided by the 
governments. For example, Human Rights Watch claimed there were over 40 million bonded 
laborers in India in 1999. The government of India claimed that only 251,000 bonded laborers 
had been identified and that 231,000 of them had been rehabilitated (Anti-Slavery 
International 2001).  
 
Today, the international community condemns slavery and labor practices similar to slavery, 
including bonded labor. This is clearly seen in conventions prohibiting bonded labor, such as 
the League of Nations Slavery Convention (1927),1 the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948) and the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956),2 to mention a few. 
India, Pakistan and Nepal (2000) have all signed these conventions, and have also passed 
                                                 
1 This convention defined slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers of 
the right of ownership are exercised” (Article 1.1). 
2 In this convention bonded labor is defined as “the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his 
personal services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as 
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national legislation to combat bonded labor, in 1976, 1992 and 2000, respectively. Despite the 
legislation, debt-bonded labor has proven to be a persistent problem in these countries. This is 
partly due to insufficient implementation of these laws. However, there are several other 
reasons why debt-bonded labor is still prevalent, and these reasons will be discussed later in 
this thesis. 
1.2 Bonded Labor in Nepal  
The background for this thesis is the recent interventions that have been put into action to 
eliminate the problem of debt-bonded labor in Nepal. Following the introduction of 
democracy in Nepal in 1990, debt-bonded labor practises received increased attention (Rankin 
1999:27). Nepalese NGOs started to report that labor institutions in rural districts clearly 
violated the legal standards Nepal was obliged to meet. Nepal has signed both the Slavery 
Convention of 1926 and the Human Rights Declaration. The constitution of 1990 also has 
elements that can be used to argue against debt-bonded labor.  
 
In 1992, the Nepalese human rights organization Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) 
reported that debt-bonded labor was especially prevalent in the southwestern part of the 
country. These laborers were called kamaiyas and in 1995 the official estimate by the 
government was that there were 15,152 kamaiya households (Sharma & Sharma 2003:1). 
INSEC’s estimate was higher.  
 
The kamaiya issue gathered considerable publicity during the 1990s and many NGOs, 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and trade unions lobbied for its 
abolishment. On 17 July 2000, His Majesty's Government of Nepal, through its cabinet, made 
a surprise move and declared the liberation of the kamaiyas.3 In practical terms, this meant 
that kamaiya laborers were no longer obliged to pay their debt and that the contract with their 
landlord was automatically cancelled. It also involved a punishment of 3-10 years for 
landlords who employed kamaiyas.  
 
Relief programs targeted at former kamaiyas were initiated by NGOs, INGOs and trade 
unions. These programs focused on the construction of temporary huts, the provision of food, 
                                                                                                                                                        
reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services 
are not respectively limited and defined” (Article 1.a).  
3 The Katmandu Post, 18 July 2000.  
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water, clothes and healthcare and the schooling of the children. The authorities started a 
process to identify former kamaiyas and allocate small land plots to them. However, the 
implementation of land reform has been slow and there are large variations in how much land 
ex-kamaiyas have received. Some kamaiyas are still waiting in temporary camps for the 
government’s promise of land. 
 
After the ban, the kamaiyas were no longer obliged to pay their debts to their landlords and 
could leave the landlord if they wanted. Many left the landlord immediately while some 
started to serve the same landlord under different contractual agreements. However, there are 
still a few kamaiyas today. More details about this situation will be given in Chapter 4, where 
findings from the fieldwork in the districts of Western Terai are presented.  
 
The declaration of freedom for kamaiyas made by the government in 2000 was formalized 
two years later under a new law, the so-called Kamaiya Labor (Prohibition) Act. This law 
defines bonded labor as follows:  
 
Kamaiya Labor means the labor or service to be provided by a person to his creditor 
without any wages or at low rates of wages for the following reasons: 
(1) To repay loans obtained by him or any member of his family, or to pay interest 
thereon. 
(2) To repay loans obtained by his ancestors, or to pay interest thereon. 
(3) To repay the Kamaiya loans of a Kamaiya laborer for whom he had provided 
surety to the creditor.4  
 
The definition of bonded labor used here has been criticized for being too group-specific. 
Debt-bonded labor relationships exist under many names in Nepal, and this definition does 
not cover the problem in all its forms. Furthermore, the definition emphasizes low rates of 
wages as an important characteristic of a debt-bonded labor relationship, but the term “low 
wages” is imprecise and may be disputed. I present other definitions of debt-bonded labor 
relations in section 1.4.  
                                                 
4 Kamaiya Labor (Prohibition) Act, Chapter 1.2 Definitions. 
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1.3 Labor Contracts in the Agricultural Sector 
What makes debt-bonded labor contracts unique compared to other labor contracts and why is 
debt-bonded labor criticized? To answer these questions, it is useful to consider a more 
general description of labor contracts in an agricultural setting. When land is unequally 
distributed within the population, there is a potential for a labor market and for a market for 
the rental of land (Ray 1998:412). Farmers with more land than they are able to cultivate 
themselves will hire extra labor, whereas laborers with no land may sell their labor capacity in 
exchange for money or other kinds of benefit. The labor arrangements that evolve may be 
classified according to two different criteria. 
 
The first criterion relates to the length of time a laborer is restricted to working for one 
employer only, in other words, the duration of the contractual agreement. A laborer can be 
hired on a casual basis, typically for a day, receiving wages on a day-to-day basis. Other labor 
relationships may last for one season or for several years. At the other extreme of the scale are 
lifelong relationships. Long-term labor relations are also often referred to as attached, tied or 
permanent labor.  
 
The second criterion relates to whether the landlord and the laborer operate in one or several 
markets simultaneously. For example, an employer may offer his worker a wage and 
consumption credit in a combined contract, interlinking the labor market with the credit 
market. Such contracts are called interlinked contracts. Other markets that may be linked are 
the markets for insurance and for renting land.  
 
By pairing the different options by these two criteria, we may classify a number of different 
contractual agreements. In Nepal, we typically observe four types of contractual agreement. 
The first two are casual labor and long-term labor contracts. In these two contracts, the 
landowner is the entrepreneur who hires labor according to his needs. In the two other 
contracts, the landowner chooses to hand over the responsibility for cultivating the land to a 
tenant. The landlord may opt for a fixed-rent tenancy, receiving a fixed amount for allowing 
the tenant to cultivate the land. The other option available is sharecropping, where the tenant 
does all the work but the outputs, and often the costs, are shared between the tenant and the 
landlord according to a fixed proportion, often 50%. Both of the two latter contracts combine 
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the market for labor and for land. Sen (1975:62) provides a classification of labor contracts 
(Fig. 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1. Classification of agricultural contracts and farm types. Source: Sen (1975:62) 
 
Permanent or long-term labor contracts frequently include transactions in the market for credit 
or insurance in addition to the market for land and labor. A permanent worker may, for 
instance, receive loans for consumption or investment purposes from his landlord. An obvious 
advantage of such arrangements is that it reduces the risk of strategic default. Credit 
transactions are easier to enforce when the landlord and the laborer have a long-standing 
working relationship (Ray 1998:561).  
1.4 Definitions of Debt-bonded Labor 
A common understanding of debt-bonded labor is a laborer who agrees to work for the same 
employer for a long period in exchange for a loan in kind or in cash (Breman 1974:8). The 
reason for the loan may be a sudden expense, such as at time of marriage, medical emergency 
or food shortage. The worker has to work for the same landlord until the debt is paid off, 
which is usually unrealistic because the remuneration is too low. As the debt accumulates 
over time, the laborer remains attached to the landlord in lifelong servitude. The debt may 
even be passed on to the next generation. Srinivasan’s definition of bonded labor summarizes 
these ideas in a precise way (Srinivasan 1989:203):  
 
A ‘bonded’ labor contract was defined as one in which the landlord provides 
consumption credit to the sharecropper in return for the latter agreeing to provide labor 
services (at less than his opportunity cost) to the landlord in the event that the 
Production units 
Own labor Hired labor 
Owned land Rented land Wage systems Bonded labor systems 
One family 
(e.g. peasant-owned 
farms)  
Own labor 
(e.g. co-operative 
farms) 
Private enterprises
(e.g. capitalist farms 
modern plantation) 
Public enterprises
(e.g. state-owned farms)
Private enterprises
(e.g. early plantations 
with indentured labor) 
Sharing rent 
(e.g. sharecropping 
farms) 
Private enterprises 
(e.g. tenancy farms with 
fixed-rent contract) 
Permanent bonds 
(e.g. farms based  
on slavery) 
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(random) output is inadequate to repay the amount borrowed with accumulated 
interest.  
 
Several comments may be made about this definition. Debt-bonded labor is different from 
forced labor and slavery. Slavery implies the use of force or coercion to maintain the 
relationship. A slave is the property of his master and is not entitled to make his own choices. 
Unlike forced labor, bonded labor is ex-ante voluntary (Genicot 2002:102). Strictly speaking, 
the decision to enter a debt-bonded labor relationship is based on free choice. In most cases, 
the relationship may be ended by repaying the debt. Accepting this view, it is reasonable to 
assume that the worker’s choice of debt bondage is the optimal choice within his set of 
options. If we assume that the laborer is rational and able to make a choice voluntarily, he 
chooses what is optimal for him. Thus, if he chooses debt bondage, it is because this option is 
better than his other alternatives according to the argument of revealed preferences. The fact 
that the laborer chooses a contract on very bad terms indicates that the other alternatives he 
has are just as bad or worse.  
 
However, Srinivasan’s definition states that the value of the worker’s labor supply exceeds 
that of his alternative cost. In other words, the worker would have increased his utility if he 
had used his working capacity in a different way, but he still chose not to do so. There are at 
least five reasons that may explain this behavior.  
 
First, Srinivasan’s definition implies that the contract is preferred because the landlord offers 
consumption credit. This aspect of the contract represents a utility gain for the worker because 
it implicitly provides insurance against starvation. On the other hand, the worker pays a 
premium to avoid this risk and that is why the wage the bonded laborer receives is less than 
his opportunity cost.  
 
Second, a laborer is usually free to leave the landlord if he pays the debt to the landlord. 
However, the landlord may take advantage of the illiteracy among the bonded laborers and 
manipulate the debt upwards (Villanger 2006:35; Rankin 1999:36). The increased debt size 
makes it impossible for the worker to repay the debt and he is trapped into continuing to serve 
the same landlord.  
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Third, Srinivasan (1989:203-4) describes how an agricultural worker may get consumption 
credit from two sources. Either he may borrow from a formal credit institution or he may 
obtain consumption credit through a bonded labor contract. Now, let us say that the worker is 
unable to repay his debts. According to Srinivasan, the formal credit institutions will 
expropriate the worker’s income and deny him future access to credit. Under a bonded labor 
contract, however, the landlord will not deny him renewal of loans in the future because the 
worker may repay the debt and interest through the labor services offered to the landlord. 
Thus, the guaranteed access to future credit through a landlord may explain why a bonded 
laborer voluntarily chooses to offer his labor services for less than his reservation utility. 
Through the bonded labor contract the worker is assured access to credit.  
 
Fourth, the landlord may have the ability to exercise power to limit the number of choices 
available to the worker, or even force the laborer to accept an offer he otherwise would not 
have chosen voluntarily. The type of power in this context is of a more subtle character than 
the physical violence observed in slavery. For example, if the landlord is a powerful person in 
the community, he may sanction the laborer financially through a third party (Basu 1986:268). 
If the laborer does not accept the contract, the landlord may, for instance, use a merchant 
under his control to sanction the laborer. Thus, the relationship is a voluntary one only on the 
surface. In reality, indirect threats restrict other options for the worker.  
 
Fifth, there is another reason that is often considered peripheral in conventional economics. 
The worker may choose debt bondage as it is a part of his tradition and family culture, in spite 
of the fact that better options are available. What used to be a rational and optimal choice in 
the past may no longer be the most favorable one as the structural characteristics of the 
economy change (Chenery & Srinivasan 1991:100). It may take some time before the agents 
adapt to a new environment. During this period of transition, a worker may choose to stay 
bonded even if he could be better off doing something else. One might consider this a form of 
“lagged” rationality. How long this period of transition will take is, of course, difficult to 
estimate. However, it is likely that laborers living on the edge of subsistence will be 
conservative and need a longer time to change due to their vulnerable position. If one of the 
outcomes might be starvation, it would be natural to be reluctant to try new forms of labor 
contract.  
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To sum up, bonded labor must be distinguished from slavery, as it is an ex ante voluntary 
contract. Poverty forces the laborer to accept bad contractual terms in exchange for security 
against starvation. A laborer may choose a bonded labor contract as it provides access to 
credit. Manipulation of the debt upwards by the landlords may occur. Powerful employers 
may also have subtle means of diminishing other options for the laborer, and thereby force 
him to accept debt bondage. Tradition and culture may put pressure on the laborers to choose 
debt bondage.  
1.5 Research Objective and Organization of the Thesis 
The overall aim of this thesis is to evaluate whether the living conditions of the kamaiyas 
have improved after kamaiya contracts were forbidden in 2000. To answer this question, a set 
of questions has to be answered: 1. What characterizes the kamaiya labor contract and why is 
it chosen by the kamaiyas? 2. Has the number of kamaiya laborers been reduced since 2000? 
3. If the number of kamaiyas has been reduced, what contracts have replaced the kamaiya 
contract? 4. How do former kamaiyas see their new life compared to their former life as 
kamaiya laborers? These questions will be examined by analyzing qualitative and quantitative 
data from a field survey in Western Terai in 2005.  
 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces several theoretical explanations for 
bonded labor institutions. Theoretical predictions from these theories will be derived. Chapter 
3 explains the methodology followed in the field study carried out in Nepal in 2005 and 
discusses the methodology’s strengths and weaknesses. Chapter 4 presents empirical data 
from the southwestern part of Nepal gathered in February and March 2005. Chapter 5 
discusses whether the empirical data support or reject the theoretical predictions derived from 
Chapter 2. Chapter 6 suggests different policy implications and chapter 7 concludes the thesis.  
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2. Bonded Labor and economic theory  
                                                 
5 5 kattha = 135 x 135 square feet = 0.17 ha.  
Chokat Tharu – The Story of a Former Kamaiya Laborer  
Chokat Tharu is typical of former kamaiya laborers we met in the course of our fieldwork. He became a kamaiya 
laborer when he was 9 years old and worked as a kamaiya for 22 years. During those years, he served at least 15 
different landlords, no more than 4 years for each landlord. The maximum loan he had amounted to 10,000 
Nepalese rupees, equivalent to approximately £80. When he changed landlords, he would pay off the outstanding 
debt to his present landlord using a loan from his new landlord.  
 
The last landlord he served paid him 5,000 rupees annually. The landlord he served before that gave him 720 kg of 
paddy per year and also gave him the right to cultivate 10 kattha6 land, from which he could keep all the crop for 
himself and his family. The landlord let the kamaiya family live in a small house on the farm. He also provided 
meals, but only for the kamaiya worker, not for his wife and children. Chokat’s wife worked as a shepherd and did 
domestic work for the landlord. She had also taken up work at other places to supplement the household income. 
However, she could only do that when she had completed her work for the landlord. The children in the kamaiya 
household worked for other landlords.  
 
Their loan from the last landlord was 500 rupees, and the landlord arranged for them not to pay any interest. Chokat 
worked every day, usually from 4-5 in the morning until 6-7 in the evening. He recalls that the landlord was very 
strict when it came to his whereabouts. The landlord would worry when he was far away from the farm. Sometimes 
the landlord would beat him and use harsh words.  
 
Chokat stopped being a kamaiya because, in his own words, he was “freed” in July 2000. In the beginning, he did 
not know this and the landlord came and told him. The landlord said he was free from that day on and did not have 
to give him anything in return The landlord also promised to give him a buffalo, but never did so. Chokat actually 
wanted to stay with the landlord because he did not have any house to go to. The landlord refused because he risked 
a penalty if he continued to employ kamaiyas. The family then moved to the nearby city of Mahendranagar in Suda 
and rented a room there. They managed to survive on casual work.  
 
The president of the District Administration Office suggested that he should go to the settlement camp for ex-
kamaiyas, where he is now. A friend assured him: “They will give you land, go there quickly.” The government 
allocated 5 kattha of land to him and he built a house for himself and his family. He was not asked to apply for this 
land. He thinks some leader made one application for all.  
 
He thinks that if it were legal to sign kamaiya contracts today, he might not choose this type of contract. As a 
kamaiya, he worked in the house of other people. Now he works in his own house. His life as a kamaiya was very 
busy. Now he has more time to wash his body and his clothes. However, as a kamaiya he did not have any problems 
getting enough food. He thinks life is a little better now, but it is difficult to get enough food. And “sometimes,” he 
adds, “angry elephants come from the jungle and damage my house.” 
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2. Bonded Labor and Economic Theory  
2.1 Free or Unfree Bonded Laborer? 
Theoretical explanations of permanent labor contracts may be divided into two categories. 
One school, often referred to as the unfree or semi-feudal school, argues that the landlord uses 
bondage or coercion to exploit the laborer and to extract maximum surplus. The laborer is in a 
weak bargaining position and cannot in practise reject the conditions and wage offered by the 
employer (Thorner 1957:21). Compulsion and custom ties the laborer to his master. He may 
only seek alternative employment after receiving permission from his employer. Repayment 
of his debt might set him free from the relationship, but this is very unlikely to happen due to 
the low wage he receives.  
 
This perspective has been challenged over recent decades by theorists who reject the view that 
peasants are deterministically governed by culture and traditional institutions (Chenery & 
Srinivasan 1991:97 and 100-1; Shultz 1964:37; Stiglitz 1988:99-104). According to this body 
of literature, a peasant is a rational economical agent who maximizes his utility. Contractual 
agreements like bonded labor are an outcome of decisions made by rational agents who 
mutually benefit from the agreements. The institutions that arise are responses to imperfect 
information, transaction costs, and incomplete or non-existing markets, for example credit and 
insurance markets. The formation of institutions must be viewed as endogenous and therefore 
explained. The choices made by agents in this context are viewed as voluntary, as opposed to 
involuntary or irrational in the semi-feudal school. This school is labeled the free or 
neoclassical school. Typical outcomes observed by this school are institutions that interlink 
several markets, for example a labor contract that also includes provision of credit.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses theoretical perspectives supporting 
the semi-feudal perspective on bonded labor and elaborates on debt traps and patron-client 
theory. Section 2.3 demonstrates how neoclassical economics may explain the choice of 
bonded labor contracts. For example, a worker may voluntarily choose this type of contract as 
the contract smooths his income and he implicitly obtains insurance against unemployment in 
a risky labor market. I also present a model where different contracts are used by the 
employers as a screening device to find out which laborers have high entrepreneurial ability. 
Finally, I examine how unequal distribution of land may enable a powerful landowner to 
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behave as a monopsonist and create downward pressure on wages. Section 2.4 derives 
implications and hypotheses from the previous theoretical section. 
2.2 The Semi-Feudal Perspective on Bonded Labor Institutions 
2.2.1 Deliberately Designed Debt Traps 
The semi-feudal view claims that bonded labor institutions are designed to exploit workers, 
that is, to maximize surplus for the landlord. One spokesman for the semi-feudal school is 
Bhaduri (1973). In his model, the landlord gets income from renting out his property to a 
tenant. The landlord also offers consumption loans to the tenant and thus also extracts income 
from the tenant through high interest rates. The tenant’s income is not sufficient to meet his 
subsistence needs and thus he continually needs new loans from the landlord to survive. In 
this model, Bhaduri questions whether the interaction between the landlord and the worker 
may be interpreted as a voluntary market transaction where both parties gain from the 
exchange. It is more realistic to see this as a system in which the tenant is caught into a debt 
trap which the landlord uses to exploit the tenant and extract income from him. Bhaduri also 
suggests that this model may explain the lack of technological innovation in agricultural 
sector. If the landlord chooses to innovate by, for example, making agricultural production 
more capital intensive, the tenant’s income is likely to increase. The need for consumption 
loans may then decrease and the tenant may be able to escape from the debt trap. This is 
surely not in the interest of the landlord, and he reasons that his potential for surplus 
extraction is higher when no innovation takes place (Basu 1997:228). 
 
Bhaduri’s model has been criticized by Newbery (1975), who argues that the peasant may 
easily free himself from the debt trap. This is based on the assumption that the landlord does 
not use other coercive means to make sure that the tenant does not escape the debt trap. 
Newbery shows that by saving only a small amount in one year the peasant may easily escape 
the debt trap. We may then conclude that the tenant is very short-sighted since he does not 
prefer to save in one period. Another explanation for why the peasant remains in bondage is 
that the model has left out some essential factors. Following the reasoning of Basu 
(1997:236), options for alternative employment for the tenant are limited due to scarcity of 
jobs. If the landlord realizes that the laborer is about to free himself, the landlord may simply 
adjust the interest rates or the wage slightly so that the laborer’s debt again increases and the 
aspirations for freedom are diminished. From past experience the worker may be aware of this 
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manoeuvre by the landlord and sees no point in making an effort to free himself from 
bondage. In fact, the laborer may even see no realistic opportunity to ever repay his debt and 
may thus aim to increase his debt as much as possible. Breman (1974:59-60) observed this in 
his field study. Debt may be viewed as a form of income. When the debt will never be paid 
anyway, why not get as much debt as possible? The next section shows how the relationship 
between the landlord and the tenant can be governed by social structures that maintain an 
exploitative relationship.  
2.2.2 Bonded Labor and Patron-Client Relations  
The relationship between a landlord and a bonded laborer may be explained by patron-client 
theory. This theory states that the relationship between, for example, peasant and landlord 
may be governed by a rationale other than the purely economic exchange of equivalents, as 
we observe in markets. There may be an exchange of goods of more symbolic character, such 
as honor, respect and protection. 
 
A patron-client relationship describes an exchange between two parties who are unequal in 
endowment of resources (Meyer 2002:17). The underlying principle that structures the 
relationship is that a gift from one of the parties creates an emotional expectation to give 
something in return. By giving a gift, the giver creates an emotional debt on the part of the 
receiver. A gift disturbs the balance between the two, and the relationship can only become 
balanced again if a gift of the same value is returned. Suppose the receiver is not able to return 
a gift of the same value, which in our context could be a poor peasant who due to poverty is 
not able to return a gift from the landlord and thus becomes indebted to him. This gives the 
landlord power over the peasant and his power is not based on violence but rather on 
emotional indebtedness (Meyer 2002:15-6). Typically, the patron is able to offer goods, for 
example insurance and protection, while the client gives in return his labor and owes the 
patron his loyalty and support.  
 
Bourdieu (1998:96) characterizes patron-client relations as an economy of symbolic goods. In 
contrast to a market exchange, the exact value of symbolic goods is not expressed explicitly. 
In fact, to reveal the exact value is taboo, just as we remove price tags when we give presents 
to friends. The real truth of an exploitative labor relationship, that is, the exact value of the 
exchange, which can be very beneficial for the stronger party, is hidden and not spoken of. 
However, the master will only be able to maintain his position as an exploiter if he has virtues 
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that match his status. He must show generosity and dignity and treat his clients with respect 
(Bourdieu 1993:190-1). Or to use Bourdieu’s own words:  
 
And to become attached in this manner, the relation of domination and exploitation 
must be enchanted in such a way as to transform it into a domestic relationship of 
familiarity through a continuous series of acts capable of symbolically transfiguring it 
through euphemization (taking care of his son, marrying off his daughter, giving him 
presents, etc.) (Bourdieu 1998:101). 
 
The exploitative character of the relationship is repressed because it is taboo to calculate the 
true value of the exchanges that take place. As a consequence, the relationship may become 
self-evident and natural for both parties. Bourdieu calls this for doxa:  
 
…that which is beyond question and which each agent tacitly accords by the mere fact 
of acting in accord with social convention… (Bourdieu 1993:169). 
 
The labor relation becomes a silent tradition that no one questions. Bourdieu thus seriously 
challenges the standard assumptions about rational economical agents. Instead of active 
evaluation of the pros and cons of available options, the agent makes choices passively 
influenced by social structures, such as tradition. They may not be fully conscious of the 
choices they make. They are rather guided by a: 
 
…feel for the game: the player, having deeply internalized the regularities of a game, 
does what he must do at the moment it is necessary, without needing to ask explicitly 
what is to be done (Bourdieu 1998:98).  
2.2.3 Decision Making as Rule Following 
Bourdieu’s perspective on making decisions shares many characteristics with what March 
(1994:57-102) describes as “decision making as rule following”. However, in contrast to 
Bourdieu, the decision maker here is much more active in the decision process. According to 
March’s concept, a person faced with a problem does not evaluate different options and 
consequences and choose the option which is best according to his preferences, which is the 
familiar rational decision making process. The decision maker is guided by what March calls 
“the logic of appropriateness”. This requires the decision maker to answer three questions. 
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First, the question of recognition, what kind of situation is this? Second, the question of 
identity, what sort of person is he? Third, the question of rules, what should a person like 
himself do in a situation like this? Answering these questions is not an arbitrary process but 
demands careful reasoning by the decision maker. To be guided by the logic of 
appropriateness implies that the decision maker must recognize the right situation and match 
an appropriate action according to his identity. Hence, an essential question is how the 
identity of the decision maker is constructed. March suggests that identities can be created 
through socialization where individuals are taught to behave in certain ways in response to 
certain situations to fulfil cultural expectations. Identities and appropriate behavior in specific 
situations can be taught through, for instance, education, the legal system or religion. 
Individuals also adopt an identity and rules of behavior from social groups they identify 
themselves with, such as families, religious groups, castes and age groups.  
 
This alternative model of decision making provides different predictions for what will change 
a decision maker’s behavior. According to rational decision making, the decision maker will 
choose a different option if that particular option for some reason appears more attractive in 
terms of utility compared to other options. Within the framework of rule following, many 
other factors may explain a change of behavior. For example, if the decision maker perceives 
the situation differently, he may apply a different rule to that particular situation. Similarly, if 
the decision maker develops a new identity or changes the rules he applies to the situation, his 
behavior might change as well. Hence, according to this framework behavior may change for 
different reasons than under strict rational decision making.  
 
The concept of decision making as rule following may be relevant to understand the decision 
made by workers to become bonded laborers. A bonded laborer may develop an identity 
where he sees himself as a bonded laborer. Having this identity, which may have been 
developed through socialization or by observing people who are similar to him, he believes 
that becoming a bonded laborer is an appropriate response to his economic conditions. If this 
is a correct understanding of his mindset, it has important policy implications regarding how 
the number of bonded laborers can be reduced. To make bonded laborers change behavior, 
one has to change their identity and teach them other ways to respond to the situations they 
face. Hence, awareness campaigns and education of bonded laborers may be more effective 
policy instruments for reducing the number of bonded laborers, according to this theory.  
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2.2.4 Strategic alliances  
James Scott (1976:4-5) claims that the safety first principle is the underlying basis for survival 
strategies amongst peasants in Southeast Asia. The peasant chooses to minimize risk rather 
than take a chance and maximize average return. Scott also suggests that the peasant forms 
strategic alliances outside the family to reduce risk. By binding himself to a powerful agent, 
such as a powerful landlord, he will secure a food supply for his household. The peasant relies 
on what Scott calls a “subsistence ethic”, which holds that the rural elite has an obligation to 
care for the poor peasant in times of famine and food shortage. The content of this moral 
claim may also include loan provision, guarantee of employment and health services. In 
contrast, a casual laborer is not entitled to put forward these claims (Scott 1976:179), as the 
relationship between the two parties is simply an exchange of labor time compensated by 
wage. In fact, Scott claims that the peasant will choose labor institutions that guarantee a 
subsistence minimum even though the landlord may require most of his time:  
 
A tenure system which provides the tenant with a minimal guaranteed return is more 
likely to be experienced as less exploitative than a system which, while it may take 
less from him on the average, does not rate his needs as a consumer (Scott 1976:7). 
 
Of course, the rural elite expects something in return for providing these goods. The peasant is 
obliged to serve the powerful agent as a loyal servant and give political support when it is 
needed (Scott 1976:28). 
2.3 Neoclassical Explanations of Bonded Labor Institutions  
2.3.1 Factors Influencing the Formation of Labor Institutions 
In contrast to the semi-feudal or the unfree perspective, the role of coercion and tradition is 
downplayed in neoclassical explanations of bonded labor institutions. This school sees labor 
institutions as voluntary agreements between rational agents that maximize their utility given 
their endowment of resources and their reservation utility.6 The labor institutions that exist are 
thus responses to challenges faced by the tenant and the landlord when making contracts 
                                                 
6 It is possible to argue that a bonded labor maximizes his utility both according to Bourdieu’s, Scott’s and 
March’s perspective. However, the laborer’s utility is not here entirely derived from traditional economic 
variables. The worker might also receive utility from following a tradition, or to put it differently, the disutility 
of violating the tradition is high. The worker may also receive utility from following a rule (March) or by 
forming strategic alliances (Scott).  
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related to agricultural production in a rural setting. Three factors are particularly important to 
understanding the mechanisms that shape labor institutions in the rural sector of developing 
countries. First, agricultural production takes place in a risky environment with an absence of 
formal insurance and credit markets (Chenery & Srinivasan 1991:115). Second, there is a 
considerable risk of moral hazard in labor contracts (Ray 1998:448-9). Third, an agricultural 
worker’s true ability to work is hidden information for the employer and therefore there is a 
risk of adverse selection (Ray 1998:405). In the following section I will elaborate on how all 
these three factors might affect the formation of labor institutions.  
 
Coping with a Risky Environment  
The output of agricultural production depends on many factors, some of them random and 
outside the control of both the agricultural workers and the landlord, for example weather. 
This is especially problematic for a risk averse agricultural worker who may run into financial 
problems if the harvest fails. Even though he may have enough income on average over time 
to survive, he may not have sufficient savings to draw upon when an economic shock occurs. 
In addition, the worker’s employment situation is also exposed to risk. Typically, there is a 
peak season with plenty of work for all workers and a lean season where it is difficult to find 
work (Ray 1998:515). Non-agricultural casual work might be a solution in the lean season, 
but to find sufficient casual work of this type is a challenge. Therefore, agricultural workers 
both face a risky employment situation and find that their revenue from agriculture is volatile 
and unstable, making it hard for them to obtain a reliable income over time. The strategies 
used to cope with risks of this sort are usually divided into two categories, so-called ex-ante 
and ex-post risk reducing mechanisms (See Dercon 2002:143-5).  
 
Ex-post strategies deal with the consequences of economic shocks. By engaging in an 
insurance scheme a household is entitled to compensation and thereby to obtain a secure fixed 
level of consumption even if an economic crisis emerges. Formal insurance schemes rarely 
exist in the rural sector of developing countries, but there are examples of informal schemes 
(see Udry 1994). Ex-post strategies can also involve the use of accumulated wealth, for 
instance, cattle or jewelery that can be sold in case of an emergency.  
 
Ex-ante strategies, on the other hand, seek to reduce the risk faced by a household, for 
example by changing the household’s activities towards activities with low variance or by 
diversifying its income sources by choosing many activities with low covariance. Choosing 
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crops more robust to harsh weather conditions is an example of the former strategy, whereas 
diversification of crops, migration of some of the household members and employment in the 
non-agricultural sector are examples of the latter. The advantage of these strategies is that 
they reduce the probability of ending up in an emergency. Unfortunately, these strategies may 
imply a cost as the most profitable activities are avoided due to their relatively high risk.  
 
Agrarian labor institutions might be devices for the agricultural worker to smooth 
consumption or insure against economic shocks or both. The insurance and consumption 
smoothing components in these institutions will typically not be expressed explicitly 
(Alderman & Paxson 1992:2). Bonded labor arrangements seem to involve elements of both 
insurance and consumption smoothing.  
 
The Problem of Unobserved Actions  
A labor contract implies that a laborer does a job on behalf of the employer. Doing the job 
successfully usually depends on how much effort the worker puts into it. Ideally, the worker 
should be paid according to how much effort he contributes. However, in practice it is 
difficult to verify whether the worker has actually contributed the level of effort that he 
promised in the labor contract. In fact, a worker receiving a fixed income has an incentive not 
to contribute unobserved effort as he gets the same remuneration anyway. The employer 
cannot detect that the worker has not contributed with the unobserved action. This is the 
essence of moral hazard. To some extent, the landlord may reduce the problem by monitoring 
the worker, but that involves costs to the employer.  
 
Another solution to reducing the problem of moral hazard is to use the result of the work as an 
indicator of how much effort the laborer put in. However, this is problematic since the job’s 
success or failure may depend on other factors outside the control of the worker. There is not 
necessarily a direct link between effort and successful results from work. We shall see how 
the challenge of moral hazard may shape the design of labor contracts.  
 
Private Information on Laborer’s Abilities  
Workers might differ in their ability to perform a job for an employer. This information is 
private information for the worker and in principle unobservable by the employer, although 
the worker may send signals that reveal this information to the employer. The employer 
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obviously wants to hire those with good skills, but the employer can only guess who they are. 
In section 2.3.5 I demonstrate how an employer may solve this problem by screening the 
workers through offering them a menu of contracts and observing their choice of contract.  
2.3.2 Principal-Agent Theory and Labor Contracts 
In the principal-agent framework, an economically powerful principal hires and compensates 
an agent to perform a certain task. As the agent’s goals may deviate from the principal’s, this 
theory aims to identify contractual agreements and incentive structures that align the actions 
of the agent to the aims of the principal (Ray 1998:456). This theory is useful for analyzing 
the economic interactions between a landlord (the principal) and an agricultural worker (the 
agent). The worker is given the job of cultivating the land for the landlord and is compensated 
for this by the landlord. The landlord has control over a scarce resource, in this case land, 
giving him to some extent monopoly power which makes him capable of making the tenant 
take-it-or-leave-it offers. However, the terms offered by the landlord have to fulfil two 
requirements. First, the tenant may choose to devote his time to other activities, that is, his 
outside options, which provide him with a reservation utility. Thus, the terms offered to him 
must give him at least as much utility as his outside options. This is referred to as the 
participation constraint. If this constraint is not met, the tenant will not accept the contract. 
Secondly, the success of the work depends on the tenant’s provision of effort in performing 
the job. These are, however, hidden actions which are unobservable by the landlord. The 
landlord must design contract terms that ensure that the tenant has an incentive to contribute 
unobserved effort. This is called the incentive constraint.   
 
The First Best Contract (Effort is Contractable or Observable) 
We now move on to derive the optimal contract terms under different assumptions. Let us say 
that the landlord can observe the tenant’s contribution of effort without any cost. In other 
words, there are no hidden actions and thus symmetric information. The level of effort can be 
specified in the contract terms, and the landlord designs a contract that maximizes his return 
given that tenant’s participation constraint is met. Since effort can be perfectly observed there 
is no need to take into account the incentive constraint as the tenant will be immediately 
detected if he does not contribute the effort specified in the contract. Output (Q) of the land is 
a direct function of effort, Q(e) = e.7 Effort is costly for the tenant and given by the function 
c(e) = ce2/2, where c’(e) = ce > 0 and c’’(e) = c > 0. The effort that maximizes social surplus 
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is found by solving the following maximization problem Max (e - ce2/2) with respect to e. 
The first order condition is 1- ce = 0, which implies that the optimal effort is e* = 1/c. 
The cost of supplying this effort is (1/2)c(1/c)2 = 1/(2c). If the landlord wants to 
implement e* he must pay the worker a wage w so that the worker’s participation constraint is 
met. This implies that the wage the worker receives less the worker’s cost of supplying this 
effort must at least be as good as his reservation utility (u); formally this implies that we* - 
1/(2c) = u. If this participation constraint is not met, there will be no “trade” between the 
landlord and the worker. The implication of this analysis is that if the tenant’s reservation 
utility increases he must receive a higher wage, otherwise the participation constraint does not 
hold.  
 
The analysis above is unrealistic as the output is directly linked to effort. It is more realistic to 
assume that the output depends on effort and a random component, unrelated to the tenant’s 
effort (e.g. weather). Ray (1998:465-473) develops a model that captures this aspect. We 
continue to assume that effort is costless to observe. The level of output Q is random and can 
take two levels, high (H) or low (L), and the tenant may choose between two different levels 
of effort (e), e = 0 and e = 1, where the higher level of effort has a cost of E to the tenant. 
Given a low level of effort the probability for high output equals q. The probability of high 
output is p if the tenant provides high effort. We assume that p > q. We also assume that the 
tenant is risk averse and the landlord risk neutral. We also assume that high effort from the 
tenant maximizes expected surplus, hence high effort is pareto optimal. This implies that pH 
+ (1-p)L – E > qH + (1-q)L. Since effort is contractable the landlord may specify the desired 
effort level from the tenant, and, given the assumption above, he chooses a contract that 
involves a high effort level as this maximizes his expected return. He offers the tenant a fixed 
wage w where U(w) = u + E to compensate the tenant for providing high effort.  
 
The landlord, being risk neutral, has an incentive to give the tenant a fixed wage w that 
provides the tenant utility exactly equal to the reservation utility, no matter whether the output 
is high or low. Why is this so? Let us say that the landlord offered a high wage w1 in case of 
high output and a low wage w2 in case of low output. The landlord still has to meet the 
participation constraint and the expected utility of the two wage levels cannot be less than the 
tenant’s reservation utility. A profit maximizing landlord will choose wage levels so that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 This model is from Ghatak (2006). 
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participation constraint holds with equality; pU(w1) + (1-p)U(w2) = u. The expected wage is 
we = pw1 + (1-p)w2. Since the tenant is risk averse and has a concave utility function, the 
utility of the expected wage is higher than the expected utility of the two different wage 
levels, which means that U(we) > pU(w1) + (1-p)U(w2). Thus, the landlord can reduce the 
wage until the participation constraint holds with equality, U(w) = pU(w1) + (1-p)U(w2). It is 
common to refer to this wage as the certainty equivalent.  
 
In essence, what the landlord does is to extract an insurance premium for giving the tenant a 
fixed wage that does not depend on the contingent output. The landlord also assumes all the 
risk himself. Due to different risk preferences, they can both become better off if they “trade” 
risk between themselves through the labor contract. This serves as an explanation for why we 
observe some laborers enter into long-term labor contracts. To avoid a risky income, the 
tenant accepts a fixed but lower income. The level of the insurance premium the landlord can 
extract increases as the variance of the risky income for the tenant increases and also if the 
tenant becomes more risk averse, that is, his utility function becomes more curved.8  
 
A potential for trading in risk exists when two parties have different attitudes towards risk. It 
is common to assume in this literature that a wealthy landowner is risk neutral and the peasant 
risk averse. The theoretical prediction for optimal contract terms when the landlord is risk 
avers and the tenant is risk neutral is a rental contract under which the laborer pays a fixed 
amount to the landlord (Dasgupta, Knight & Love 1999:155-9). When both parties are risk 
averse, the optimal contact is that both parties receive a share of the output. Sharecropping, 
where both parties receive an equal share of output, is a typical version of this contract. 
 
It is common to assume that a person’s risk aversion decreases when he acquires more wealth 
(Varian 1992:189). Accepting this view, we should expect that poorer people are more risk 
averse and that the landlord is thus able to extract a higher insurance premium from poorer 
tenants. An implication is that we should expect more long-term labor contracts among poorer 
people. Land is the most important productive asset in an agricultural economy. Endowment 
in land is an important indicator of a person’s economic status. Thus, we should expect that 
landless people have a tendency to enter long-term labor contracts.  
 
                                                 
8 See Appendix A.1 to chapter 2 for a calculation of insurance premiums for different risk preferences and 
different variances. The risk premium increases in variance and in risk aversion. 
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The first best solution rests on the assumption that effort is costless to monitor or that there is 
no room for hidden action by the tenant. These assumptions are not particularly realistic. If 
the tenant enters a fixed pay contract with a landlord, the landlord has to monitor the tenant 
and make sure that he puts in the amount of effort that they agreed on in the contract. 
Monitoring and enforcement of the contract obviously represents a cost to the landlord. Note 
also that the tenant receives a fixed wage, which gives him few incentives for being a diligent 
worker as he gets the same payment irrespective of his level of effort. The way the labor 
contract is designed does not motivate the tenant to put in effort and, hence, the risk of moral 
hazard is high. This aspect of the contract is likely to make the long-term contract less 
profitable for the landlord as monitoring and enforcement costs will increase.  
 
The costs of monitoring may be reduced if the tenant and landlord work closely together, 
making it easy for the landlord to observe the tenant’s work performance. Many of the 
mechanisms in the patron-client relationships described in section 2.2.2 may be interpreted as 
ways of decreasing the landlord’s monitoring cost. For example, if a landlord is generous and 
takes care of the tenant’s children, the tenant is more likely to feel a pressure to work hard for 
the landlord. Through the patron-client relationship the worker internalizes a strong obligation 
to work hard for the landlord and thus reduces the cost of monitoring.  
 
Figure 2.1 Optimal contracts in principal-agent theory. Source: Ray (1998:471) 
 
Fig. 2.1 illustrates the optimal contracts between the principal and the agent. The horizontal 
axis depicts the utility of the wage received by the tenant in the state where output is low and 
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the vertical axis when output is high. The curves show the utility of the landlord. His profit 
increases as the curves move closer to origo. Point F in the diagram is the first best solution 
where the landlord’s utility curve intersects with the tenant’s participation constraint. This 
contract is on the 45 degree line, which implies that the tenant receives the same wage in both 
states of nature. If the reservation utility of the tenant increases, it implies that the 
participation constraint shifts to the right. As a consequence, the optimal contract will imply a 
lower utility to the landlord.  
 
In sum, the first best contract is beneficial for the landlord since the wage given to the tenant 
is low. The contract is also pareto optimal. However, the assumptions on which this contract 
is based are not very realistic. Moral hazard is likely to occur and monitoring of the worker 
involves costs to the landlord. To reduce the problem of moral hazard and reduce monitoring 
costs, the landlord may choose another contract, which we will look at in the next section.  
 
Second Best Contracts (Effort is not Contractable, Scope for Moral Hazard) 
Under the assumption that the tenant’s provision of unobserved effort cannot be monitored 
without cost, we need to provide the tenant with incentives for contributing unobserved effort 
so as to avoid moral hazard. A contract then has to meet the incentive constraint, which in 
essence implies that the tenant voluntarily contributes unobserved effort because he is 
rewarded for this. Ray (1998:469) shows how this means that the landlord is no longer able to 
provide full income insurance to the tenant. The tenant’s wage must be higher in the good 
state than in the bad. The incentive constraint implies that the tenant must bear some risk. The 
optimal second best contract is shown in point S in Fig. 2.1. The contract has to fulfil both the 
participation constraint and the incentive constraint. The shaded area shows all the possible 
contracts the landlord may offer the tenant where both the participation and the incentive 
constraints are met. The landlord chooses point S as this contract maximizes his utility. The 
landlord’s utility curve is on a lower level at point S than under the first best contract (F). 
Therefore, the utility of the landlord is reduced when the first best contract can no longer be 
achieved. However, under this new contract the cost of monitoring the laborer is likely to be 
less since the tenant has an incentive to contribute the unobserved effort voluntarily. Thus, 
there are two opposing effects here. One the one hand, the change from the first best contract 
to the second best implies that the landlord’s profit is decreased. On the other hand, the cost of 
monitoring is likely to decrease. This suggests a trade-off for the landlord between concerns 
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about profit and costs of monitoring. From the tenant’s perspective, the trade-off is between 
full insurance and incentives for effort.  
 
The welfare for the tenant should not be affected when the contract is changed from a fixed 
wage contract to a second best contract. The profit-maximizing landlord will set the wage 
exactly equal to the tenant’s reservation utility, which is a function of his outside option. 
Unless the outside options increase in utility, the tenant will not receive a higher wage. 
Therefore, the tenant’s utility should be the same when a fixed wage contract is replaced by 
the second best contract.   
 
Stiglitz (1974) develops a model that sheds light on how the contract terms depend on the 
tenant’s risk preferences and the variance of the crop.9 The output q is a function of effort e 
and a random shock ε with zero mean and variance σ2.  
 
 = q  + e ε  
 
The landlord is assumed to be risk neutral and the tenant risk averse with the following utility 
function, where y is his income and rT a measure of the tenant’s risk aversion. 
 
 = ( )U y  − ( )E y 12 rT ( )Var y  
 
The disutility for the tenant’s effort is 1/2ce2. The tenant either gets paid through a share (s) of 
output or pays a fixed rent (R) to the landlord and gets the rest himself; y = sq – R. The 
tenant’s incentive constraint has to be met. If he is to put in effort he has to be rewarded 
accordingly. 
  
 = e ⎛⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟argmax  − ( )U y
1
2 ce
2
 
The solution to this10 is 
 = e sc  
                                                 
9 This presentation of Stiglitz’s model is based on a simplification made by Ghatak (2006).  
10 See Appendix to chapter 2 for more calculation. 
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The landlord maximizes his income subject to the incentive constraint  
 
 = ( )E  + ( ) − 1 s q R  + ( )s  − 1 sc R  
and subject to the participation constraint that ensures that the tenant receives at least his 
reservation utility u:  
 
 ≤ u  −  −  − se R 12 rT s
2 σ2 12 ce
2
 
The solution to this problem11 is  
 
 
 = s 1 + 1 rT σ2 c   
 
The solution has an interesting interpretation. The share (s) received by the tenant decreases if 
the tenant is more risk averse and if the crop is more risky (increased variance). This is similar 
to the results given in the previous section, but the difference is that the payment to the tenant 
is given as a share of output in contrast to a fixed wage. If the tenant is risk neutral, the 
optimal contract is a fixed rent contract. This is also the most efficient according to the 
Marshallian argument (Ray 1998: 425-427). This type of contract gives the tenant strong 
incentives for effort.  
 
Summary 
The principal-agent analysis shows that the first best solution is pareto optimal and optimizes 
social surplus. However, this solution is based on unrealistic assumptions of an absence of 
moral hazard and that perfect monitoring is not costly. I have argued that these assumptions 
are more likely to be met through some of the mechanisms that take place in patron-client 
relationships, but it is very unlikely that moral hazard can be eliminated completely. Thus, the 
landlord faces a trade-off. He may offer a fixed and low wage, but unfortunately with high 
probability of low effort from the tenant. A second alternative for the landlord is to offer a 
contract where the tenant receives a share of production, which implies that the tenant 
receives a higher wage in the good state. The first alternative is most profitable for the 
landlord, but the model does not take into account the cost of monitoring. If the cost of 
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monitoring is high, the landlord might be better off offering a share contract. The third 
alternative for the landlord is to offer a rent contract where the tenant pays a fixed sum to the 
landlord. This contract is considered the most efficient because the tenant has maximum 
incentives for effort.  
2.3.3 Consumption smoothing through labor tying 
Tenants not only face risk in terms of stochastic agricultural output. Tenants who try to find 
work at the spot market also face the risk of unemployment due to different levels of demand 
for labor in the slack and peak seasons or to a scarcity of casual work in general. Bardhan 
(1983:503-6) develops a model in which a risk averse laborer and a risk neutral landlord agree 
to enter a long-term labor contract. The laborer receives a fixed wage conditioned on tying his 
labor supply to the landlord. The wage the permanent worker receives is the annual expected 
wage on the spot market minus an insurance premium. This arrangement is not only beneficial 
for the tenant, who obtains consumption smoothing throughout the year. The landlord gains 
too because he avoids the risk of not getting enough workers in the peak season. In addition, 
the landlord can save recruitment costs by hiring labor on a long-term basis (Bardhan 1979).12  
 
In this model, mean output is x. The random aspect of output is captured in A. To cultivate the 
land, a fixed amount of labor (β) is required per unit output. The employer’s profit is given by 
equation (1) when the labor requirement is less than the amount of tied labor (Lt). The 
landlord’s profit is the revenues from production less the cost of two periods of minimum 
consumption (c) to the tied laborers. Bardhan assumes that both parties have equal discount 
rates (ρ). If the output requires more labor than the landlord has tied to himself, he must find 
extra labor (βAx -Lt) on the spot market which can be hired at wage W. In this case the 
landlord obtains the profit given in equation (2).  
  
(1) π = π1 =  Ax – (2 + ρ)cLt   if βAx1 ≤ Lt     
(2) π = π2 =  Ax – (2 + ρ)cLt – (βAx -Lt)W   if βAx1 > Lt,   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 See Appendix to chapter 2 for more calculations. 
12 According to efficiency wage theories the employer offers the worker a wage that is just above the market 
clearing wage level. This wage gap gives the employed worker an incentive for effort since if his performance is 
unsatisfactory he will end up in the pool of casual laborers. A tied labor contract implies that the tied laborer 
receives better conditions than casual workers. The laborer’s productivity might also increase due to better 
nutrition as a consequence of the regular meals he receives under a long-term labor contract.  
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If we now assume that the landlord is risk neutral and workers are risk averse, the optimal 
arrangement between them is, according to this model, a tied labor contract where the laborer 
is secured by a fixed income equal in both periods and near or at the laborer’s minimum 
consumption. He thus obtains consumption smoothing over time (Bardhan 1983:503). 
Theoretically, tied labor arrangements will only exist if both the worker and landlord differ in 
their risk preferences and if there is sufficient variation in demand for labor in the two seasons 
(Mukherjee & Ray 1995: 209-10). 
 
Bardhan also makes a prediction of who will be tied laborers. A worker who is not tied to the 
landlord obtains an income y0 in the lean period and y > y0 in the peak period. We assume that 
y0 is identical for all such workers, but in the lean season the laborers have a different 
alternative income source, that is, y has a cumulative distribution G(y). W is the wage in the 
spot market and the worker will enter the spot market if W > y. Now, there will be a critical 
value of y that separates those who are better off accepting a tied labor contract and those who 
join the pool of casual laborers. Those who are more likely to find well-paid casual work or 
non-labor income (higher y) are less likely to accept a tied labor contract. The need for the 
insurance or consumption smoothing provided by the tied labor arrangement is not necessary 
as the laborer is better off being a part of the pool of casual workers. The worker will choose 
the labor tying arrangement if the following inequality holds: 
 
 < ( )EU ( )max ,y W ( ) + 2 ρ ( )U c  
 
A worker who chooses the tied labor contract receives more utility from two periods of 
minimum consumption (right hand side of inequality) compared to the expected utility the 
worker receives from either casual labor (W) or other income generating activities (y).  
 
Many predictions can be derived from this model. First, tied labor contracts will only exist if 
there is a difference in risk preferences between the workers and the employers. Also, the 
most risk averse workers are most likely to enter labor tying arrangements. Second, reduced 
seasonal variation in the demand for labor implies less demand for tied labor contracts. Third, 
if the wages in the market for casual workers goes up or workers get access to better income 
opportunities (for example, their own land), the number of tied labor contracts should 
decrease.  
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2.3.4 Interlinkage with Credit 
It is common to observe in the agricultural sector in developing countries so-called 
interlinkage, which implies that a labor contract includes dealings in several markets 
simultaneously. A common example is the landlord’s provision of consumption credit to the 
laborer. This used to be viewed as a form of exploitation, as discussed in 2.2. Braverman & 
Stiglitz (1982) show, however, that interlinkage increases the expected utility for both parties. 
The mutually beneficial arrangement can be explained by the fact that the landlord usually has 
better access to credit than a landless peasant, who may be excluded from the formal credit 
market. It has also been argued that the landlord has an incentive to charge lower interest than 
the alternative credit source for the tenant, usually the moneylender, because this increases his 
control over the tenant’s behavior (Dasgupta, Knight & Love 1999:164).  
2.3.5 Screening Models – Self-selection by Contractual Choice 
So far, we have assumed that laborers are homogeneous and do not differ in their ability to 
work. An employer who hires laborers will obviously choose the best qualified laborer. 
However, the laborer’s true ability to perform a specific task is hidden information to the 
employer and can only be revealed after the job has been completed. The worker himself is 
aware of his ability. This demonstrates clearly the problem of asymmetric distributed 
information: a laborer knows his ability, but the employer does not. A way for the employer 
to overcome this problem is to offer different types of contract that reward the worker 
according to his ability. The true ability of the worker will thus become apparent as he 
chooses the optimal contract according to his ability.  
 
It has been suggested that as agricultural laborers accumulate human and physical capital, 
they progress from wage labor to sharecropping, to renting and finally owner cultivation. This 
is known as the agricultural ladder hypothesis based on the study of farmers in the American 
South (Spillmann 1919). It is disputed whether workers in fact climb this ladder, but there are 
several types of evidence that support the idea that as workers climb the ladder they contribute 
more human and physical capital and the landowner provides less (Cox 1944). Spillman’s 
research suggests that workers receive higher remuneration at higher rungs of the ladder 
(Spillmann 1919:70). He also suggests that a larger share of the profit of the land is given to 
workers at higher rungs of the ladder. These differences in income between the three contracts 
might reflect the risk for the worker under the three contracts.  
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The agricultural ladder may be seen as a way to describe the worker’s provision of 
entrepreneurial inputs (Hallagan 1978:345-6). Income may be seen as consisting of two 
components, rent and profit (Knight 1957:ch. 9). According to Knight, profit is the difference 
between total revenue and total rent and is closely linked to entrepreneurial input. A tenant 
under a fixed wage contract will receive a wage for the value of his time. The landowner 
provides all the entrepreneurial input and thus all the profit. Under sharecropping, both parties 
contribute entrepreneurial input and the profit is shared likewise. Under a fixed rent contract, 
the tenant provides all the entrepreneurial input and hence takes all the profit. 
 
Hallagan (1978:349-53) develops a model where a landowner chooses laborers that differ 
when it comes to their entrepreneurial ability. The amount of entrepreneurial input the worker 
may potentially contribute is unobserved to the landowner and it is assumed that it is more or 
less impossible or very costly to monitor the provision of entrepreneurial input. Offering the 
laborers a menu of contracts may be a screening device to separate workers with high and low 
entrepreneurial abilities. The entrepreneurial input might reflect the worker’s skills 
concerning planting, irrigation, cultivating and harvesting, all factors that affect the total 
agricultural output positively. Agricultural output is hence considered to be an increasing 
function of the worker’s entrepreneurial input. 
 
Hallagan argues that if the worker is offered a fixed wage contract he has no incentive to 
supply any entrepreneurial input. He receives the same wage anyway. Now suppose the 
worker is offered two types of contract, a fixed wage contract and a rent contract that involves 
a fixed amount paid to the landowner, regardless of total output. In the latter contract the 
tenant keeps the entire surplus that exceeds the rent given to the landlord. Workers with high 
endowments of entrepreneurial input (E) have thus clearly an incentive to choose rent 
contracts as their total revenue will exceed their income under a wage contract. Workers with 
low levels of E will benefit most from a wage contract.  
 
These ideas can be illustrated in a diagram where workers’ income is displayed on the vertical 
axis and the entrepreneurial input on the horizontal axis (see Figure 2.2). WW represents the 
fixed wage contract. RR shows the worker’s income under a fixed rent contract, the income 
increases due to larger entrepreneurial input. The worker’s income under a sharecropping 
contract is shown as SS. In this case, both the landowner and the tenant provide E and the 
curve will be in between RR and WW.  
 29
 
Hallagan’s models suggest that workers with E ranging from 0 to E1 will be better off 
choosing a wage contract. A wage contract will give such a worker higher income than both a 
sharecropping and a rental contract. A worker with E ranging from E1 to E2 will profit most 
from a sharecropping contract. The top end of workers when it comes to entrepreneurial 
ability, with higher E than E2, will opt for rental contracts. A worker with 0.5 units of E will 
receive Y2 under a sharecropping contract, compared to Y1 and W under a rental contract and 
a wage contract respectively.  
  
Figure 2.2. Selection of labor contract based entrepreneurial input. Source: Hallagan 1978 
 
Hallagan’s model provides an explanation why we may observe several types of contract 
existing simultaneously in the same area. Workers with low levels of entrepreneurial input 
will automatically choose the fixed wage, whereas more skilled laborers choose labor 
contracts where they can contribute more entrepreneurial input.  
2.3.6 A Landlord Behaving as a Monopsonist  
In all our discussions above we have assumed that the tenant reservation utility is 
exogenously given. This section examines the possibility that landlords may influence this 
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reservation utility if they have market power. In a conventional analysis of the labor market, 
we assume many suppliers and buyers, thus generating a competitive equilibrium wage. The 
landlord will then hire labor until the marginal product of the laborer equals the wage. 
Departure from this efficient solution may arise when distribution of land is highly unequal. 
For example, if one or a few landlords own all land in an area and laborers are landless, the 
landlords do not any longer have to take the wage as given, but may have power to determine 
the wage. The unequal landholding favors the employer’s ability to exercise market power 
when it comes to wage determination, given that the laborers are not organized in labor 
unions.  
 
In the pure monopsony model there is one single buyer of labor and many workers offering 
their labor (Varian 1993:438-440). We assume that the wage is an increasing function of how 
much labor the employer hires, w´(L) > 0, and that the firm’s product is to be sold in a 
competitive market. The profit maximization problem facing the monopsonist is:  
 
(1) MaxL  pf(L) – w(L)L 
(2) pf’(L) = w + w’(L)L 
 
The solution (2) states that the marginal revenue of labor should be equal to its marginal cost 
of labor. Note that the right hand side of the equation shows how the cost of labor, that is, the 
wage, increases as the employer hires more workers. The solution to equation 2 is satisfied at 
point A in Figure 2.3. The monopsonist pays wage WM and hires LM units of labor. The free 
market solution is where the supply curve crosses the demand curve at point B. The free 
market solution generates both a higher wage and employment, WE and LE, respectively. The 
free market solution also implies a higher output and is the pareto optimal solution. However, 
the employer’s profit is largest when he behaves as a monopsonist and where the wage is 
under the competitive level (C). 
 
If the laborers are unionized, the wage will be somewhere between WM and WA, depending 
on the bargaining power and preferences of the labor union. If the number of landlords 
increases, the market wage will gradually approach the competitive solution (WE). Co-
operation among the landlords is increasingly difficult to achieve when landowners (the 
buyers of labor) increase in number, due to the higher cost of collective action. One single 
landlord will always have an incentive to hire an extra laborer at a higher wage. He then 
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increases his production and his profit. When the other landlords observe this, the cartel will 
gradually dissolve and the wage level will converge to the competitive level. Monopsony is 
thus fragile and is easily undermined by competition.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. Equilibrium wage and labor demand when a landlord behaves as a monopsonist. 
 
The question is how the employers are going to maintain this cartel that enables rent 
extraction from the workers. In agricultural areas where the population size is low, peasants 
may easily move to other places and establish their own farms and avoid the surplus 
extracting policies. One possibility is coercive policies initiated by the landowning elites to 
force workers to offer their labor cheaply (Behrmann & Srinivasan 1995:2670). If coercion is 
not possible, an alternative solution is to reduce the reservation utility for workers’ outside 
options sufficiently so that they will offer their labor voluntarily to the landlords. Behrmann & 
Srinivasan (1995:2673-7) suggest four policies that have been used historically by 
landowning elites to make workers offer their labor input voluntarily. First, the ruling class 
may restrict the farmers’ right to capture unoccupied land and not let the farmers formalize 
their property claims. Second, it may be in their power to impose taxes that discriminate 
against small free peasants. Third, the ruling class may set up a market mechanism that 
refuses to buy from free peasants. Fourth, provision of public goods such as credit and roads 
may strongly favor the ruling class and thus reduce the profitability of the small-scale free 
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peasant. The result of these distortions is higher rent for the landowners but efficiency loss for 
the economy as a whole.  
 
Conning (2005:14-5) also suggests that landlords may use several mechanisms to sustain their 
cartel by limiting or restricting the laborer’s outside options. For example, tied labor 
arrangements can be such a device. Other examples are the restriction of laborers’ physical 
mobility, restriction on access to credit and limitations on the right to own land. Following the 
abolition of slavery or serfdom, it has been common to observe elites advocating for laws that 
obtain the goals mentioned above (Ransom & Sutch 1977:198).  
 
A ban on serfdom or bonded labor arrangements can result in a transition to an efficient 
solution followed by a higher wage, but the landowning elite is likely to react by imposing 
other market distortions to extract surplus, which is likely to harm the freed laborers. In 
Conning’s model, total output for the society is largest under the competitive solution, but the 
profit for the landowners is much higher under the tied labor regime, and thus pareto-inferior. 
A transition to the competitive regime reduces the landlords’ profit and they have no incentive 
to encourage this transition.   
 
A way to make the collusive equilibrium even more stable is to establish a stratified system in 
the society. A more servile labor force may be obtained by linking certain tasks, such as 
agricultural labor under tied labor contracts, to a certain class with a specific distinction such 
as race, caste, nationality, ethnicity or gender (Conning 2005:18). Akerlof (1976) develops a 
model that demonstrates how a stratified society, like those under caste systems, can remain 
in equilibrium binding each individual to a fixed position in the social hierarchy. If one person 
deviates from the rules in this system he will be punished by all the others. Thus, the system 
remains in equilibrium.  
 
Schaffner (1995:243) suggests that the landlord deliberately tries to limit the horizon of the 
workers in order to pressure them to offer their cheap labor voluntarily. The concept of 
“limited horizon” implies here that there exist better employment opportunities for the bonded 
laborer but the workers are not conscious of these options due to their limited horizon. Even if 
the servile bonded laborers are aware of better employment opportunities elsewhere, the 
laborer refuse to exploit these opportunities due to what Schaffner describes as a group 
reference effect. A servile worker will behave similarly to other workers whom they interact 
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with on a daily basis. If they interact only with other bonded laborers, they will ignore better 
income opportunities that might exist elsewhere. 
2.4 Conclusions and Theoretical Implications 
This chapter has given two broad perspectives to explain the existence of bonded labor. The 
first perspective describes how workers are kept as bonded laborers against their will. The 
employers may, for example, use debt traps (Bhaduri, section 2.2.1) or more subtle 
mechanisms in patron-client relations (Bourdieu, section 2.2.2) to force the laborer to choose 
bonded labor contracts, or, the bonded laborer may develop an identity as a bonded laborer 
that makes him believe that being a bonded laborer is the appropriate option for him (March, 
section 2.2.3).  
 
The other perspective on bonded labor is that this is a voluntary agreement between the 
employer and the worker where both parties gain. Bonded labor or tied labor may exist for 
many reasons according to this perspective. First, differences in risk preferences between the 
employer and the worker (Ray, section 2.3.2) may explain why the worker and the employer 
enter the agreement. Second, variations among workers in their access to alternative 
employment opportunities and a risky market for casual labor may also explain the magnitude 
of tied labor contracts (Bardhan, section 2.3.3). Third, the landlord screens the workers by 
offering them a menu of contracts (Hallagan, section 2.3.5). Those with the lowest 
entrepreneurial abilities will opt for tied labor contracts. Fourth, unequal distribution of land 
enables the employer to behave as a monopsonist and extract surplus from the laborer and 
reduce the social surplus (Varian, see section 2.3.6). 
 
Question 1: What may explain the existence of kamaiya contracts?  
According to the unfree perspective, the kamaiyas have ended up in this kind of contract 
through, for example, debt traps designed by the employer. Another possibility is that the 
kamaiyas have developed identities through which they perceive being kamaiyas as the 
appropriate labor contract for them. If these perspectives are an accurate explanation for the 
existence of kamaiya contracts, we should expect that kamaiyas rarely change to other kinds 
of labor contract. Once a kamaiya, he stays a kamaiya for a long time or his whole life. Also, 
we should expect that kamaiyas do not consider other alternatives to being kamaiyas, either 
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because repaying their debt is impossible or because they are simply not aware of other 
employment opportunities.  
 
Under the assumption that kamaiyas make decisions in the classical rational economic way, 
kamaiya contracts exist because both parties gain from the agreement. An employer is usually 
assumed to be risk neutral and a poor worker risk averse. Thus, there is a potential for trading 
in risk. For example, principal-agent theory suggests that the optimal contract between a risk 
neutral employer and a risk averse tenant is a fixed wage contract where the tenant implicitly 
buys insurance from the employer. Similarly, Bardhan’s model of labor tying predicts that 
risk averse workers with limited access to alternative employment opportunities will have an 
incentive to enter into a tied labor arrangement with a risk neutral landlord if there is 
sufficient seasonal variation in the demand for labor. Some predictions can be made from 
these two models. First, the most risk averse persons are more likely to enter kamaiya 
contracts. Data on risk aversion is not available. However, since land is an important indicator 
of wealth, landholding may serve as a proxy for the risk-bearing capacity of the household. 
Thus, if risk aversion decreases with wealth, households with no or little land will be more 
likely to enter kamaiya contracts. Second, remote areas where households have less access to 
alternative employment opportunities will have more kamaiya contracts than areas with better 
access to alternative employment opportunities. Distance to cities or other markets should be 
positively correlated with the proportion of kamaiya contracts. Since there is more casual 
work available in cities, the demand for tied labor contracts will be less in areas close to 
markets or cities. Third, according to principal-agent theory the fixed wage contract does not 
give an incentive for the tenant to provide effort. It is likely that tenants under fixed wage 
contract – here, the kamaiya – will be considered to be lazy.  
 
According Hallagan’s screening theory, workers who enter tied labor arrangements should be 
those with the lowest entrepreneurial skills. This cannot really be tested, since information on 
entrepreneurial skills is not available from the data we gathered.  
 
The last theoretical perspective suggests that the landlord behaves as a monopsonist due to his 
large landholding. According to this perspective we should expect that areas where 
inequalities in landholdings are large should have a higher number of kamaiya contracts.  
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Question 2: What factors may change the number of kamaiya contracts? 
According to the unfree perspective, the number of kamaiya contracts may be reduced if the 
kamaiyas start to question whether being a kamaiya is an appropriate labor contract for them. 
According to the rule following concepts of March, the kamaiya may develop a new identity 
which causes him to choose a different option as appropriate according to the situation he 
faces. We should expect to observe that kamaiyas increasingly question whether they are 
getting a fair wage compared to how much work they put in. Also, we should expect that 
kamaiyas are increasingly made aware that they can choose other contracts than the kamaiya 
contract.  
 
According to principal-agent theory and Bardhan’s model for tied labor, the underlying 
predictors of kamaiya contracts are differences in risk preferences among the employers and 
workers and to what extent the workers improve their access to alternative income 
opportunities. If these factors change, we should expect a change in the amount of kamaiya 
contracts. For example, if alternative income opportunities for laborers increase or if laborers 
become less risk averse, we would expect a decrease in the number of kamaiya contracts.  
 
However, the number of kamaiya contracts may be reduced more suddenly if a third party 
regulates the economic interactions between the employer and the laborer. In Nepal, kamaiya 
contracts were forbidden in 2000. This should reduce the number of kamaiya contracts if the 
ban is perceived as a credible threat to the landlords and workers. Rational economic actors 
will only accept a ban if they perceive that the cost of not accepting the ban is greater than 
complying with it. This all boils down to whether the third party, here the state, manages to 
introduce a credible ban and cause the landlords to change behavior.  
 
Question 3: Will a ban on kamaiya contracts make the kamaiyas better off?  
According to the unfree perspective, the kamaiya is held in bondage against his will through, 
for example, debt traps, as suggested by Badhuri, or the kamaiyas have developed an identity 
as a bonded laborer and remain kamaiyas for that reason. One element of the ban on the 
kamaiya contract was that the kamaiyas’ debts were cancelled. If debt was the reason that 
kept the kamaiyas bonded, the cancellation of debt should have enabled them to choose better 
and more profitable employment opportunities and made them better off. A ban can help the 
kamaiyas escape the more mental aspect of this pattern of exploitation (the patron-client 
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relationship) and apply more rational economic reasoning in the search for employment 
alternatives and not be tied by culture and tradition. 
 
If we assume that the kamaiya contract in fact was a rational efficient institution (according to 
principal-agent theory and Bardhan’s model for labor tying) where both parties gained, 
banning the labor contract will make both parties worse off since they are no longer able to 
choose their best option. For instance, the laborer would not any longer be able to smooth his 
consumption through the labor contract. They had chosen to enter a kamaiya labor contract in 
the first place (revealed preferences). If they do not have this best option any longer, their 
utility will decrease. This implication of reduced welfare may be challenged if the ban causes 
other effects in the economy that increases the utility of the former kamaiyas. For example, 
the ban may lead to a rise in the wage level for casual labor. This possibility will be discussed 
more thoroughly in chapter 5.  
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
A.2.1. Simulation of Insurance Premium  
This simulation shows how the landlord can extract different levels of insurance premium for 
different levels of the tenant’s risk aversion and different variance of his income (x). In the 
example the tenant can choose between a fixed income or to engage in a lottery with two 
states, one good and bad. The tenant has the following exponential concave utility function:  
 
 = ( )U x  − 1 e
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟−
x
R
 
 
R is the tenant’s risk tolerance. R can be found be asking the tenant what is the largest Y he 
would be willing to win with a probability of 0.5 when there is the same probability that he 
will lose Y/2. The answer to this question is the risk tolerance (Clemen and Reilly 2001:543-
4). The more risk averse, the lower the value of R. In the table, I have calculated how much 
the landlord can extract in insurance premium to make the tenant indifferent between taking 
part in the lottery with the two different states or receiving a fixed wage. The expected wage 
is 50. (100/0) means that the tenant receives 100 in the good state and 0 in the bad state. The 
conclusion from the simulation is that the landlord can extract a higher insurance premium 
when the tenant’s risk aversion increases and the variance of income increases.  
 
 100/0 90/10 80/20 70/30 60/40 
R=800 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.1
R=400 3.1 2.0 1.1 0.5 0.1
R=200 6.2 4.0 2.2 1.0 0.2
R=100 12.0 7.8 4.4 2.0 0.5
R=50 21.7 14.5 8.5 3.9 1.0
R=25 33.1 23.7 14.8 7.3 1.9
 
A.2.2 Calculation of Stiglitz’s Model (1974) 
Stiglitz’s (1974) model shows how contract terms depend on the tenant’s risk preferences and 
the variance of the crop. The output q is a function of effort e and a random shock ε with zero 
mean and variance σ2.  
 
 = q  + e ε  
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The landlord is assumed to be risk neutral and the tenant risk averse with the following utility 
function, where y is his income and rT a measure of his risk aversion. 
 
 = ( )U y  − ( )E y 12 rT ( )Var y  
 
The disutility for the tenant’s effort is 1/2ce.2 The tenant either gets paid through a share (s) of 
the output or he pays a fixed rent (R) to the landlord and gets the rest himself; y = sq – R. The 
tenant’s incentive constraint has to be met. If he is to put in effort he has to be rewarded 
accordingly. 
  
 = e ⎛⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟argmax  − ( )U y
1
2 ce
2
 
 = ( )E y ( )E  − sq R  
 = ( )E  − sq R  − se R  
 = ( )Var  − sq R s2 ( )Var q  
 = s2 ( )Var q s2 σ2  
 = e ⎛⎝⎜⎜
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1
2 rT s
2 σ2 12 ce
2  
 =  − s ce 0  
 
 = e sc  
The landlord maximizes his income subject to the incentive constraint  
 
 = ( )E  + ( ) − 1 s q R  + ( )s  − 1 sc R  
and subject to the participation constraint that ensures that the tenant receives at least his 
reservation utility u:  
 ≤ u  −  −  − se R 12 rT s
2 σ2 12 ce
2
 
By using the incentive constraint we can simplify to  
 ≤ u  −  − 12
s2
c R
1
2 rT s
2 σ2  
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Solving for R: 
 = R  −  − 12
s2
c
1
2 rT s
2 σ2 u
 
This can be substituted into the landlord object function which is maximized with respect to s:
 
⎛
⎝
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⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟argmaxs  +  −  − 
( )s  − 1 s
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The first order condition is 
 =  +  −  − 1 2 sc
s
c rT s σ
2 0
 
Solving for s
 
 = s 1 + 1 rT σ2 c  
 
 40
3. Study Design and Methods  
3.1 Introduction 
The fieldwork for this thesis was carried out in Nepal during the months of February and 
March of 2005. The fieldwork was a part of a larger research project led by Magnus 
Hatlebakk at Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway, in collaboration with colleagues from the 
Centre for Economic Development and Administration, an applied research institute at the 
Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu, Nepal. The aim of this project was to map and evaluate 
interventions into bonded labor (kamaiya) in Nepal, including the emancipation in 2000. The 
project started in the autumn of 2004 and ended in 2006. The Norwegian Research Council 
sponsored the project. This chapter explains the choice of research methodology and how the 
field study was carried out. In the latter part of this chapter I discuss possible weaknesses of 
the methodology. 
3.2 Choice of Research Design 
The goal of the field study was to examine the effects on the agricultural economy after a ban 
on the kamaiya labor institution was introduced in 2000 and to find out whether the living 
conditions of former kamaiya laborers in Western Terai had improved. An ideal 
methodological approach to this problem would be to interview a sample of kamaiyas before 
and after kamaiya contracts were forbidden. This “treatment” group should be compared with 
an identical control group of kamaiyas who were not exposed to the reform. A control group 
is necessary because the living conditions for kamaiyas might be influenced by many factors. 
Here, however, the point is to isolate the effect of the ban on the living conditions for 
kamaiyas, holding other factors that might affect those living conditions fixed. A control 
group would enable us to do so and provide a so-called counterfactual hypothesis, which 
means that this group would tell us what would have been the situation for the kamaiyas had 
the intervention not taken place. This methodology would, in principle, be able to identify the 
effect of the ban on the kamaiyas’ living conditions and control for other observable factors 
that affect the kamaiyas’ living conditions. However, we were not able to use this approach 
since we could not perform interviews with kamaiyas before the intervention, and we had no 
control group that was not affected by the intervention.  
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An alternative strategy was to perform a cross-sectional survey. This method gives data that 
can tell us how relatively well off former or present kamaiyas are compared to other groups in 
society at the time the survey was undertaken. To find out whether or not the kamaiyas’ living 
conditions have improved, we have to rely on their subjective evaluations. This type of survey 
cannot tell for sure whether the living conditions for kamaiyas have improved due to the ban 
or due to other factors. Nevertheless, based on the data gathered we may investigate whether 
it is likely that the living conditions for kamaiyas have improved.  
 
Hatlebakk (2006) compares the casual wage level in villages dominated by kamaiyas with 
casual wage levels in villages not dominated by kamaiyas before and after the kamaiya 
reform. Section 5.4.3 describes how this methodology gives support to the conclusion that the 
reform had a positive effect of the welfare of the kamaiyas. Inspired by this methodology, I 
compare the payment the kamaiyas received prior to and after the reform.  
 
A survey may be either intensive or extensive. An intensive approach, where few individuals 
are asked to give information about many variables, furnishes in-depth knowledge of how the 
respondents perceive the world (Ringdal 2000:108). This approach is preferred when little 
knowledge is available about a social phenomenon (Ringdal 2000:103). One weakness of this 
approach is that the findings may not be generalizable to the wider population. Generalization 
was of great concern in this project. We therefore chose an extensive approach, covering 
many respondents and using random sampling of households to enable inferences to be drawn 
about a larger population (Bulmer & Warwick 1983:9). Previous studies in Nepal had 
gathered substantial qualitative knowledge about the kamaiyas and their living conditions. 
This study was able to build on this body of literature to design questionnaires covering 
relevant aspects of the group’s living conditions.  
 
Before the fieldwork started, several key informants among NGOs in Kathmandu who had 
been working on the kamaiya issue were contacted. They provided a useful introduction to the 
topic and explained the present status of the ex-kamaiyas in Nepal. Some NGOs and research 
institutes have published a number of reports about the kamaiyas (see, for example, Gautam 
(2001), Abullaish (2004), Sharma (1998, 2001, 2003) and Gurung (2004). ILO and INSEC 
turned out to be very helpful key informants.  
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3.3 Sampling of Households 
The sampling of respondents was done before entering the field. Following the emancipation 
in 2000, the Nepalese authorities identified 18,291 kamaiya households in the districts of 
Dang, Banke, Bardiya, Kailali and Kanchanpur, all in western Nepal (Sharma 2003:1). Based 
on these figures, we selected 20 Village District Committees (VDC)13 with a high proportion 
of kamaiyas. A VDC consists of 9 wards. We decided to visit 2 wards within each VDC so as 
to be able to compare findings within one VDC. To obtain a random sample, we chose 
households randomly from official voter lists. Each ward-level sample consisted of 20–28 
households. Since kamaiyas come mainly from the Tharu indigenous group, we selected 
wards within VDCs with a high density of Tharu names,14 as we reckoned this would be a 
good indicator of the presence of kamaiyas or ex-kamaiyas. Nearly all kamaiyas are Tharus 
(see section 4.3).  
 
Our fieldwork became more complicated due to general strikes imposed by the Maoist 
guerrillas. The strikes reduced the number of VDCs we were able to visit. Also, in some areas 
we were refused access to the villages by the Maoist guerrillas. We had to relax the selection 
criteria of VDCs based on a high presence of kamaiyas. We ended up choosing VDCs that 
were less affected by the Maoist conflict. Altogether, 8 VDCs in 4 districts were covered. 
 
One of the problems we encountered was that we found very few former and present 
kamaiyas in our samples (see section 4.2). Thus, to obtain more data about the kamaiyas, we 
complemented our samples by interviewing present and former kamaiyas we came across in 
the villages, in addition to a sample of kamaiyas from the new kamaiya settlements. These 
extra interviews were always performed after completing the interviews with the people in our 
samples. The reason for this was that we did not want to reveal to the villagers that we were 
primarily interested in kamaiyas. The aforementioned additional interviews were not chosen 
by a random sample procedure. In other words, the information we obtained about kamaiyas 
came from two groups of respondents: kamaiyas and former kamaiyas in the random samples, 
and kamaiyas and former kamaiyas from the non-random samples of extra interviews.  
                                                 
13 Each district consists of many Village Districts Committees (VDC). 
14 Our local guide was able to identify Tharu names from the voter lists. 
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3.4 Interviews as a Source of Information 
According to the positivistic perspective on interviews, those being interviewed are perfectly 
capable of giving true and accurate information about their lives. Their answers are not 
affected by the context of the interview and they are neutral reporters of their lives (Thagaard 
1998:79). The opposite view, the constructivist position, regards the respondent’s description 
of his life as invented during the interview. Here, the information gathered is, to a large 
extent, biased by the relationship between the respondent and the interviewer (Thagaard 
1998:79). Our methodological position represents an intermediate one between these two. We 
believe the respondent is able to give reliable information regarding the household. However, 
it is important to consider how we, as interviewers, may influence the respondent’s answer. 
One aspect we were concerned about was strategic self-representation among the respondents. 
For example, if the respondents believed we were from an NGO looking for target groups for 
a distribution of benefits, they could potentially give a distorted picture of their living 
conditions hoping that this would make them more likely to be chosen as beneficiaries. To 
avoid this problem, we made it very clear from the beginning of each interview that we did 
not represent any NGO. We presented our mission as a joint research project by the 
University of Bergen, Norway, and the Tribhuvan University of Kathmandu, aimed at 
mapping the living conditions of the residents in order to give policy advice to the authorities 
that would benefit all living in the area.15  
3.5 Structure of the Interview  
Interviews may be performed with little structure and open-ended questions. The respondent 
is thus free to focus on issues of relevance to him, and this may shed light on problems not 
even thought of by the researcher (Thagaard 1998:80). In contrast, an interview may be well 
structured, having questionnaires with fixed alternatives and closed-ended questions, and the 
sequence of questions determined in advance. A definite advantage of the latter approach is 
that it makes it easier to compare answers between individuals. Our approach lies somewhere 
between these two positions, a so-called semi-structured interview. Flexibility is the core of 
this method (Thagaard 1998:81). We decided in advance what types of economic information 
we wanted to gather regarding the household’s economy. However, the sequence of questions 
was flexible, and we were open to listening to stories and other information that would 
                                                 
15 In many developing countries, universities are considered to be benign institutions (Bulmer & Warwick 1983: 
77).  
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increase our knowledge of the kamaiya labor institution. Our aim was to let the interview take 
the form of a “purposeful conversation” (Erlandson 1993:86). Each interview took on average 
30–40 minutes. We never used the term “kamaiya” during the interview to avoid influencing 
the respondent’s use of employment categories. To put the kamaiya issue on the table, we 
asked about their employment history. Preferably, we interviewed the husband, as he is 
considered to know most of the household’s economic affairs. If he was not around, we tried 
to come back later. If he was still not there, we interviewed the wife or the eldest son.  
3.6 Discussion of Methodology  
The quality of a research methodology may be judged on four criteria: reliability, validity, 
representativeness and appropriateness to the research question (Bulmer & Warwick 1983: 
10-11). A reliable method should give the same results even if it is applied by different 
researchers or at a different point in time. For instance, one could argue that case study 
research is not reliable, since the results depend, to a large extent, on the case selected or the 
researcher’s personal observations. A standardized interview might increase the reliability of 
the results. However, standardized interviews may be problematic in terms of reliability if the 
respondents do not understand the questions or answer strategically. Validity refers to whether 
or not the data obtained measure what they are intended to measure. The representativeness of 
the results concerns to what extent conclusions from the study may be generalized to a larger 
population. According to Bulmer & Warwick’s last criterion, a good research design should 
produce relevant data and results able to answer the research question. In the next sections, I 
shall discuss how our methodology performs on these criteria.  
 
Reliability 
Our respondents were unfamiliar with English. Therefore, we needed to use translators, which 
may have caused mistakes and misunderstandings. We did not record our interviews on tape, 
but made notes. Inaccurate notes may have been a source of error.  
 
It seems that we managed to avoid the problem of strategic answers from the respondents. 
They did not tell extreme life stories and seemed to be quite balanced and interested in giving 
us a realistic picture of their lives. We avoided this problem most likely by being very clear 
when we introduced ourselves and our purposes to the respondents. They never thought we 
were an NGO distributing benefits.  
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We found out that people were not shy to tell us about their lives. We thought that many 
would be reluctant to tell us about their economic affairs and working relationships, but this 
was hardly ever the case. Many of the life stories we heard were quite similar. Thus, if the 
respondents were reporting strategically about their lives, they would have had to coordinate 
their answers before we arrived. This is unlikely because our arrivals were mostly 
unannounced.16 During the interviews, many spectators gathered. This may also have created 
peer pressure to tell the truth. Sometimes, the spectators disagreed openly and corrected the 
respondents. We were aware that influential people in the village could potentially create 
biased answers by their presence, but such people were, at least to our knowledge, rarely 
among the spectators.  
 
Another challenge was that of inaccurate answers. People often gave inconsistent and very 
approximate answers, or changed their minds during the interview. When we were faced with 
inconsistent answers, we would try to ask questions to clarify these inconsistencies. 
Sometimes, this was enough to solve the problem, but not always. Some of our questions 
focused on events that had happened many years ago. To recall details from a long time ago 
was probably challenging for many of the respondents and this might have been another 
source of error.  
 
Validity 
The data we collected were primarily economic. One could argue that economic data are not 
sufficient to fully understand the kamaiya labor institution since it includes also many non-
materialistic elements. However, during the interviews we were not only concerned with 
economic data but also asked questions about non-economic aspects of the kamaiya labor 
institution.  
 
One may question whether a household or an individual is the right unit of analysis in this 
particular context. We interviewed the husband in the household assuming that he is the most 
important decision maker in the family and also the best source of information regarding the 
decisions made by the household. One might as well argue that the household members 
behave more as individuals and are to a smaller extent concerned with the interests of the 
other household members. There is an ongoing debate on how household allocation decisions 
                                                 
16 Our arrival could have been known to the villagers where we needed permission from the Maoists to enter.  
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may be predicted. There are two groups of household allocation models: unitary and 
collective (Quisumbing & Maluccio 2000). The unitary model suggests that the household’s 
resources are pooled and allocated according to a common preference of the household. This 
model is increasingly being challenged empirically by collective models where household 
decisions are made through bargaining between the household members (see Quisumbing & 
Maluccio 2000 for discussion).  
 
Representativeness 
Many of the households in our samples were impossible to find or had moved. In fact, we 
were not able to interview 30.5% of the households in the random samples (see section 4.2). If 
the reasons why these households were absent had to do with factors of interest for our 
research question, then the missing cases would create a biased sample and general 
conclusions based on the sample would be problematic. For example, former kamaiyas might 
have been forced to migrate due to poverty and this could be the reason why we were not able 
to find them. This is likely to have been the case and the samples are likely to be biased. Too 
general conclusions based on the samples are therefore problematic.  
 
The Maoist conflict forced us to select areas that were less affected by the conflict. This might 
have caused a biased selection of VDCs, as the presence of Maoist guerrillas could be a 
response to poverty and exploitative labor relations.  
 
Another problem our methodology presents is that information about households is not 
always complete. We failed to obtain data concerning all the variables for all the households. 
This reduces the number of units our estimates are built on and makes the estimates more 
uncertain.  
 
The appropriateness to the research question 
The aim of this study was to examine how a ban on kamaiya contracts had affected the living 
conditions for the kamaiya. The methodology chosen was a blend between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Given the constraints in terms of time and resources, this combined 
approach was sufficient to gain knowledge of how the ban had affected the lives of the 
kamaiyas. However, more precise quantitative estimates would have been possible with more 
data covering more VDCs.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained our choice of methodology. We chose to perform semi-structured 
interviews with respondents from random samples. The advantage of our methodology is that 
it provided us with a qualitative understanding of the kamaiya system and insight into how 
former and present kamaiyas perceived and perceive the kamaiya system. The weaknesses of 
our methodology include the possible problems of generalizability and the potential sources 
of error discussed above. Construction of precise quantitative statistical estimates is thus 
problematic. The estimates should only be seen as suggestive or qualitative. The data are not 
accurate enough for a formal statistical testing of hypotheses. However, the data will shed 
light on the hypothesis derived in chapter 2.  
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4. Data from the Fieldwork 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents our findings from the field study, which will be compared with other 
studies on the same subject. The chapter is outlined as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview 
of the context kamaiya laborers live in. Section 4.3 describes features of the kamaiya labor 
system. Section 4.4 gives an overview concerning the interventions that have taken place for 
kamaiyas since the kamaiya system was abolished in 2000. It also presents the living 
conditions former kamaiyas are facing now and how they perceive their new situation. I also 
investigate what kinds of contract have replaced kamaiya contracts. 
4.2 The Context in which the Kamaiyas Live  
Nepal is a least developed country landlocked between China and India. In 2005, 31% of the 
population in Nepal lived below the national poverty line17 and the country ranked 195th in the 
world in terms of GNI per capita.18 Ecologically, Nepal is divided into three different zones: 
the mountains, the hills and the plains. The latter is called Terai and has most of Nepal’s 
cultivable land. This part of the country is often referred to as the “bread basket” of Nepal. 
The population is increasing in this area due to migration from the hills and the mountains. 
Agriculture is the main economic activity in the country, employing more than 66% of the 
population according to the National Census in 2001. Our fieldwork was conducted in four 
districts of Western Terai (Fig. 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 shows the random samples. Each column represents a sample from a ward in a 
VDC. All samples have several missing cases. In total, we managed to find and interview 
69.5% of the intended respondents. In the random samples, we found in total 3 present 
kamaiyas, 23 former kamaiyas, 1 present kamaiya landlord and 9 former kamaiya landlords. 
In 2000 the Department of Land Reform in Nepal estimated the proportion of kamaiyas in 
each VDC. In general, our samples had a higher proportion of ex-kamaiyas than the estimate 
made by the Department of Land Reform. This is reasonable since we chose wards within the 
VDC that had high proportions of Tharus (see section 3.3).  
 
                                                 
17 Nepal at a Glance. World Bank 2006. 
18 World Development Indicators database 2006, World Bank. 
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Figure 4.1. Map showing VDCs where fieldwork was conducted 
Source: Central Department of Geography, Tribhuvan University, Nepal. Prepared by Madhab P. Bhusal. 
 
Table 4.1. Overview of random samples  
 
K
al
ik
a/
2 
K
al
ik
a/
1 
N
au
ba
st
a/
5 
B
in
au
na
/8
 
D
ur
ga
ul
i/4
 
Ja
na
ki
na
ga
r/8
 
Su
da
/1
 
Su
da
/2
 
Su
da
/3
 
Su
da
/7
 
D
ai
je
e/
1 
To
ta
l 
Sample size 24 24 29 26 22 24 25 22 23 24 23 266 (69.5%) 
Moved/not found 2 5 9 15 9 9 6 3 3 13 6 81 (30.5%) 
Realized size of sample  22 19 20 11 13 15 19 18 20 11 17 185 (100%) 
             
Present kamaiyas 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 (1.6%) 
Present kamaiya landlords 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0%) 
Ex-kamaiya landlords 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 0 1 2 0 11 (6.0%) 
Ex-kamaiyas 5 4 2 2 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 23 (12.4%) 
Proportion ex-kamaiya  
in sample 0.23 0.21 0.1 0.18 0.23 0.2 0.11 0.11 0 0 0  
Proportion of kamaiyas in 
VDC* 0.08 0.08 
**- 0.14 0.08 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.04  
             
Households in VDC 1516 1516 - 790 1864 807 1744 1744 1744 1744 3627 15352 
Households in ward 215 171 - 129 156 142 124 90 140 168 209 1376 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
* Proportion of kamaiyas (ABCD), according to the census undertaken by the Department of Land Reform in 
2000, in Sharma and Sharma (2003). 
** Sampling was done during a visit to an election office. Data were not available. 
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In addition to the random samples, 44 extra interviews were undertaken (Table 4.2). In these 
samples, there were 37 former kamaiyas, 4 present kamaiyas, 1 former kamaiya landlord and 
2 present kamaiya landlords. The extra interviews were conducted in the same wards as the 
random samples, or in camps for former kamaiyas.  
 
Table 4.2. Overview of non-random samples  
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Ex- kamaiyas 2 0 5 0 0 8 22 84.1 37 
Present kamaiyas 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 9.1 4 
Ex-kamaiya landlords 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2.3 1 
Present kamaiya landlords 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4.5 2 
Total 2 4 5 1 2 8 22 100 44 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
 
 
Table A.1 in Appendix to Chapter 4 gives an overview of the general economic context of 
villages where the former and present kamaiyas live. The median landholding for households 
varies between 10 and 20 kattha.19 In each sample, there are typically 5–7 sharecroppers. The 
typical size of the land sharecroppers operate for the landlord is 20 kattha. The wage level is 
approximately 70 rupees per day, in addition to one full meal.20 There are regional differences 
in the wage level. Wage levels are higher in the westernmost VDCs, for example Suda. There 
also seem to be gender differences in wages, with women receiving less.  
4.3 The Kamaiya Labor System 
4.3.1 General Features of the Kamaiya Contract  
This section aims to describe the general characteristics of the kamaiya labor institution based 
on our interviews. Our findings will be compared to results from previous research. In the 
kamaiya system, a landowner employs a farm laborer, the kamaiya, on an annual basis. 
During this period, the kamaiya commits his labor exclusively to one landlord. We observed 
no general rule as to whether other family members also worked for the same landlord. It has 
been suggested that, on average, 1.5 members of the kamaiya household work for the landlord 
(Sharma 1998:30). This seems reasonable based on the general impression from our 
                                                 
19 5 kattha = 135x135 square feet = 0.17 ha.  
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interviews. We observed that the wife of the kamaiya often did domestic work for the 
landlord, sometimes compensated by a wage; at other times, her labor was a part of her 
husband’s labor contract and wage. We found many cases where the wife only worked for 
half a day for the landlord, thus giving her an opportunity to seek work at other places once 
her job at the landlord’s house was finished. In some instances, the children of the kamaiya 
worked as shepherds for the landlord, and many reported that this had been the starting point 
in their lifelong “career” as kamaiyas. However, it appeared to us that children working as 
kamaiyas were more common during and before the early 1990s. Table 4.3 depicts how often 
the wife of the kamaiya had to work for the landlord.  
 
Table 4.3. Involvement of kamaiyas’ wives in kamaiya cases 
Modality of involvement Observations % 
Full time 24 38.7 
Part time 11 17.7 
Not involved 27 43.6 
Total responses  62 100.00 
Source: Chitrakar (2006:40).  
The kamaiyas reported 12-13 working hours every day, with only short breaks during the day. 
They were only allowed to take a few days off annually. The movements of the kamaiya were 
restricted and they had to get the landlord’s permission to leave the farm. When there was no 
work to be done on the fields, the kamaiyas did other work on the farm. We also heard of 
cases where the landlord “rented out” his kamaiya to other landlords if there was a lack of 
work on his own farm. This arrangement did not lead to any extra payment to the kamaiya.  
 
The kamaiya system leaves the landlord with obligations too. Apart from paying wages 
(Section 4.3.2), he has to see to his kamaiya’s well-being. It is expected that the kamaiya is 
helped in times of crisis. The landlord must, for instance, provide an emergency loan if the 
kamaiya household faces a food shortage. Sick kamaiya family members also expect to 
receive help and medical treatment from the landlord. These obligations have also been 
observed by other researchers (Holm & Løkke Rasmussen 1999:75). In some cases, a hut for 
the kamaiya household was provided by the landlord, but approximately half of the former 
kamaiyas in our sample owned their own home when they were kamaiyas. A summary of the 
kamaiya contract is given in Table 4.4. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 We made a distinction between a full meal (1) and a small meal (0.5).  
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Table 4.4. A summary of the kamaiya contract 
 
 
Terms for the kamaiya 
• The contract terms last for one year. 
• Works for 12-13 hours daily. 
• Not allowed to work for others. 
• Sometimes the wife and children of the kamaiya work for the landlord. 
• Restrictions on mobility. Cannot leave the landlord’s property without 
permission.  
• Able to leave the landlord if he repays his debt. 
 
Landlord’s obligations 
• Provides fixed annual wage. Meals for the kamaiya are mostly 
included. 
• In some cases, provides a small house for the kamaiya.  
• Provides consumption credit. 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
 
4.3.2 Different Modes of Wage Payment 
Several remuneration systems for kamaiya laborers were observed. I have grouped them into 
four categories: payment in cash, payment in kind, payment in kind plus a plot of land, and 
share of output.   
 
Cash Payment 
An estimate from Sharma (1998:37) suggests that only 9.2% of the kamaiyas receive annual 
cash payments. Nevertheless, we got the impression from our respondents that annual cash 
payments have been used more frequently since the ban on kamaiya contracts was introduced. 
For instance, two of the present kamaiyas we interviewed were paid in cash. For one of them, 
the payment had switched from annual to monthly. These two received 10,000 rupees per year 
and 1,250 rupees per month. 4 out of the 23 ex-kamaiyas in the random samples and 7 out of 
the 37 ex-kamaiyas from the extra interviews used to be paid in cash. These contracts were 
ended in the period 1998-2004. To find a typical value for these contracts I converted all the 
cash payments to, for example, 2004 prices by using a price index.21 After correcting for 
inflation the median fixed cash payment is then approximately 7,500. Sharma (1998:36) 
                                                 
21 I use the price data on rice/paddy in Nepal from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
Downloaded from their web page 25 September 2006. Based on price data from 1991-2003, I calculate the 
average price increase per year, which is 6%.  
 53
suggests a lower estimate for cash payments, i.e., 3,000–4,000 rupees per year (4300-5700 
rupees when adjusted for inflation).  
 
Annual Payment in Kind 
In this kind of payment, the kamaiya is given a fixed amount of crop, typically 720kg of 
paddy, supplemented by some maize, wheat, lentils, vegetables, salt, oil and clothes. Many 
kamaiyas reported the landlord gave them a fixed amount of paddy and a variable amount of a 
different crop, depending on how good the harvest had been. To estimate the value of this 
payment, I multiplied the amount of each crop given to the kamaiya by typical market prices 
we gathered in the areas we visited.22 The median value of the fixed amount of crop given to 
the kamaiya is 6,800 rupees in the random samples and 5,000 in the non-random samples. 
Merging the two types of sample, the median value is 5,900 rupees and the 25% percentile 
and 75% percentile are 4,680 and 7,510 rupees respectively. This form of payment was the 
most common one. 
 
Annual Payment in Kind and an Allotted Piece of Land 
In this arrangement, the kamaiya is given one allotted plot, being allowed to keep the crop 
either for private consumption or to sell it on the market. The plot given to the kamaiya is 
typically 10 kattha. Kamaiyas receiving this form of payment do not normally receive meals, 
as the plot of land is supposed to provide enough food for his family. In addition to the plot, 
the kamaiya receives a fixed amount of crop, typically 720 kg of paddy, supplemented by 
some other crops. The value of the fixed crop they receive is very similar to the fixed in-kind 
payment. 5 kamaiyas had this mode out 23 ex-kamaiyas in the random samples and 4 out of 
37 in the extra interviews of ex-kamaiyas. I have estimated the value of the output of this plot 
of land at 8,500 rupees. To obtain this estimate, I asked 25 farmers how much they produced 
on their land. This was multiplied by the aforementioned crop prices, which then gave a rough 
estimate of the value of having one kattha of land. A weakness of this estimate is that it does 
not take into account the costs incurred by the kamaiya when cultivating this plot.  
 
                                                 
22 This estimate is based on prices in the harvest season as this is when in kind payment is received. I collected 
the prices from our respondents. These are typical prices and provide the foundation for my estimates: paddy, 6.5 
Rs (rupees)/kg; oil seed, 23.5 Rs/kg; wheat, 7 Rs/kg; pulses, 22 Rs/kg; and maize, 7.5 Rs/kg.  
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Output Share 
Under this contractual agreement, the kamaiya receives a fixed share of the crop, but his share 
is only one third or one fourth of the output. Usually sharecroppers get half of the crop. They 
usually have to assume their part of the investment costs as well, such as seeds, fertilizer and 
sometimes irrigation. Kamaiyas who receive a share of output do not have to consider these 
costs. Some respondents told us that groups of kamaiyas, for example 5-10 kamaiyas, used to 
work on a big land plot and received one third of the crop. More recent kamaiyas who got a 
share of the crop typically said that only one or two kamaiyas worked together on a piece of 
land. We asked some kamaiyas who got a share of the crop how much this one third usually 
equated to in crop. Their answers were very similar to those who got a fixed annual crop as 
wages. The median value of the share of the output received by the kamaiya was 7,300 
rupees. This estimate is only based on 5 kamaiya cases, all from the extra interview samples.  
4.3.3 The Value of Meals  
Most of the kamaiyas (85%) reported that they receive daily meals from the landlord as part 
of their payment. The question is how much these meals are worth. In one of the modes of 
payment described above, the kamaiya was given a land plot to cultivate by himself instead of 
meals. The value of the crop from this land plot was estimated at 8,500 rupees. If we assume 
that kamaiya contracts are more or less equal in value, despite the different modes of 
payment, 8,500 rupees gives an indication of how much the meals are worth for one kamaiya 
in one year. However, this estimate is probably too high, since the cost of cultivating the land 
plot is not subtracted.  
 
One landlord we spoke to used to give the kamaiya a choice between meals every day or 8–9 
quintals of paddy per year. This implies that the value of meals is, approximately, 6,000 
rupees per year. Typically a kamaiya receives two full meals and one small meal.23 Thus, 
according to this landlord, one full meal is worth 6.57 rupees.24 This is a low estimate. Casual 
agricultural workers reported that they were sometimes given a choice between meals and 
wage combined, or no meals but a higher wage. The difference between these two options 
suggests that the value of one full meal ranges from 10 to 20 rupees. Other studies have 
suggested that the value of a snack meal (0.5 meal) is 9 rupees and a full meal, 15 rupees 
(Hatlebakk 2004:20). Now, let us say that a meal is worth 15 rupees and the kamaiya gets 2.5 
                                                 
23 Here, a small meal is estimated to be half the value of a full meal. 
24 6,000/(365*2.5). 
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meals per day. The total value of all the meals would thus be 13,688 rupees, which seems to 
be an unreasonably high estimate. If we choose a lower value for a meal, say 10 rupees, the 
annual value of all the meals is 9,125 rupees, which is still very high. I argue that the lower 
estimate at 6,000 is the most realistic one. The reason is that estimates based on the valuation 
of meals derived from a casual wage seem to be too high. In addition, the value of meals in 
long-term contracts and short-term casual wages may not be directly comparable.  
 
The discussion above suggests that the meals probably constitute more than 50% of the value 
of the kamaiya contract. In the remaining part of this thesis I use 6,000 rupees as an estimate 
of the total annual value of the meals in the kamaiya contract. Table 4.5 gives an overview of 
the different estimates of the value of a kamaiya contract. Due to the large number of 
observations, the estimates involving a fixed pay in kind are probably more reliable. This 
suggests that a kamaiya contract is worth, approximately, 12,000 rupees. All the estimates are 
very sensitive to how meals are valued, since meals constitute a large part of the wage of the 
kamaiya. Hatlebakk (2006) has also estimated the value of a kamaiya contract and his 
estimates are similar.  
 
Table 4.5. Kamaiya contracts, different modes of payment 
 
 Median 25% 
percentile
75% 
percentile
Value of 
meals/ 
value of 
land plot 
Obs. Value of 
kamaiya 
contract 
Distribution 
in Sharma 
1998:37 
Cash  8,500 5,500 10,300 6,000 8 14,500 9.2% 
Fixed wage in kind  5,800 4,700 7,500 6,000 52 11,800 
Fixed wage in kind  
and land plot  
4,700 4,700 5,900 8,500 9 13,200 
54.7% 
Output share 7,300 5,900 9100 6,000 5 13,300 36.1% 
Total     74  100% 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
Note: The estimates in this table are based on fewer observations than the total number of the kamaiyas and 
kamaiya landlords reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. I have excluded some of the observations due to low data 
quality.  
 
The kamaiya contract also comprises other benefits that are not included in the estimates 
above. These benefits are a residential hut, access to credit, medical treatment and clothes. 
Valuation of these benefits is complicated and no attempt is made here to do so, as they do not 
represent the main components of the kamaiya contract. However, there is no question that 
these benefits further increase the value of the kamaiya contract.  
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4.3.4 Change of Landlord 
The duration of the kamaiya contract is one year. At the festival of Maghi, held in the month 
of Magh (January/February), kamaiyas may change landlord. Reasons for such change can be 
dissatisfaction on the part of the kamaiya or the landlord regarding contractual terms or work 
performance. Our respondents said they often ended the relationship when they were not 
satisfied with the landlord, for example, when the landlord failed to pay on time or demanded 
too much work. In order to be able to switch landlord, indebted kamaiyas needed to get a loan 
from their new landlord to repay the outstanding debt to the former. The total debt for the 
kamaiya thus remained the same, even after changing landlord. The ability to change landlord 
provides an outside option for the kamaiyas, however, only within the village where they live. 
Even though they cannot easily escape from the kamaiya system, their outside option offers 
them a limited degree of freedom to move between landlords. The negotiations between the 
kamaiya and the landlord were real in the sense that the kamaiya was not handed passively 
over to another landlord. The kamaiya uses this opportunity to increase his annual pay and 
improve the contract terms for himself. We heard stories where kamaiyas got offers from 
potential kamaiya landlords and used these offers to improve their contractual terms with their 
present landlord. Rankin (1999:30) also supports the idea that real negotiations took place 
annually between the kamaiya and the landlord.  
 
We found that present kamaiyas used the opportunity to change landlords quite often. Some 
even changed landlords every year. It seems as though kamaiyas started to change landlord 
more often during the 1990s. Sharma (1998:35) concludes that 70% of kamaiyas stayed less 
than 5 years and 17% between 6 to 10 years with the same landlord.  
4.3.5 Reasons for Becoming Kamaiya 
To better understand the reasons why the kamaiya system exists, we asked the respondents 
why they became kamaiyas in the first place. Typical answers are listed in Table 4.6. 
Employment and food security through the kamaiya system seems to be an important reason. 
Entering a kamaiya contract may also be a solution to a financial crisis faced by the 
household. 
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Table 4.6 Reasons for becoming kamaiya 
 
• Lack of alternative employment opportunities, i.e., sharecropping and casual work 
• No access to land. Landless 
• Became kamaiya as a child 
• Became kamaiya to survive 
• His father was indebted and the son had to take over the loan and serve the same landlord 
• Needed to take loan to get married 
• Sudden economic crisis accompanied by a need for credit 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
 
Holm & Løkke Rasmussen (1999:68-73) make a distinction between orthodox and 
unorthodox kamaiyas. An orthodox kamaiya depends on the landlord for his household’s 
subsistence to a larger extent than the unorthodox kamaiya. The remuneration system for 
orthodox kamaiyas makes it difficult to accumulate savings and the kamaiya perceives the 
system as a way to survive. A statement from one of the respondents in the field study 
illustrates the perspective of an orthodox kamaiya:  
 
(…) I became a kamaiya, because we did not have our own land. I am landless and 
houseless, so to get food, I work as a kamaiya. I have been working for the same kisan 
(landlord) in 30 years. My son is also working as a kamaiya for another kisan. We are 
a big family, when the family size grows; we have to work for food. (…) To change 
kisan is very hard work, so why take such types of risk to go to another kisan (Holm & 
Løkke Rasmussen 1999:68).  
 
The unorthodox kamaiya household combines kamaiya work with alternative sources of 
income, mainly wage labor, but also income from migrated household members. When 
subsistence is secured for the household through a kamaiya contract, other household 
members may engage in more risky, and often more profitable, employment alternatives. 
Holm & Løkke Rasmussen suggest that kamaiyas need to become unorthodox kamaiyas in 
order to increase their total income and thus be able to escape the system. Increased income 
and savings would enable them to buy land and bulls. This would secure subsistence and at 
the same time serve as a signal to landlords that they are hard working, making them 
attractive to landlords offering sharecropping contracts. Sharecropping is considered a better 
option than being a kamaiya. Holm & Løkke Rasmussen observed that families with social 
responsibility for the elderly and children tended to be orthodox kamaiyas, whereas 
households with many male members capable of working were unorthodox kamaiyas.  
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Among our respondents we observed mostly unorthodox kamaiyas. Almost all had started to 
find alternative income sources for their households. Typically, the wife of the kamaiya 
worked part-time for others, aside from the kamaiya landlord.  
4.3.6 Socio-economic Information on Kamaiyas  
In total, 96% of kamaiya laborers belonged to the Tharu ethnic group (Sharma & Sharma 
2003:7). However, not all Tharus are kamaiyas. The total Tharu population in Nepal was 
estimated at 1.53 million in the 2001 population census, which represents 6.8% of the total 
population (CBS 2003:97). The density of Tharus is especially high in mid- and far-western 
Terai. They are believed to be the original inhabitants of Western Terai and lived in the jungle 
before it was turned into agricultural land in the 1960s. Due to the eradication of malaria in 
the 1950s, many migrants from the hills and the mountains flocked to Western Terai in the 
following decades (Sharma 1998:11). Tharus were hired to work for the new landowners and 
they gradually slipped into debt bondage. Most of the present kamaiyas have ancestors who 
used to live in the district of Dang. Migration from the hills created pressure on the land in 
Dang, and Tharus moved and started to work for landowners in Bardiya, Kanchanpur and 
Kailali (Sharma 1998:12).  
 
Rankin (1999:29-34) distinguishes between two types of kamaiya practise in these districts. 
The first type is found among Rana Tharus concentrated in Kailali and Kanchanpur. In this 
system, only 1 or 2 kamaiyas work for a kisan (landlord), who is often a small-scale 
subsistence farmer himself. The kisan works alongside the kamaiyas on the field and works 
the same hours as the kamaiya. There is not a large difference in status between the kamaiya 
and the kisan. The kamaiya is treated as a family member in the kisan’s household. However, 
the kamaiya does not have the right to speak in political meetings in the village and he is seen 
as part of the kisan’s wealth and property. The kamaiya rarely face violence in this kind of 
kamaiya practise. Nor is a kamaiya doomed to remain a kamaiya forever. It is possible for the 
kamaiya to settle his debts with the kisan and become a subsistence farmer through saving.  
 
In the other type of kamaiya system, between a kamaiya and a jamindar (landlord), the terms 
for the kamaiya are generally worse. The working hours are longer and the landlord uses the 
kamaiya’s debt in a more manipulative way to prevent the kamaiya from changing landlord or 
accumulating savings in order to escape kamaiya status. Physical violence against the 
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kamaiya is also more common and is used by the landlord to maintain the kamaiya bond. The 
jamindar does not engage in farm work himself, but hires at least 3-4 kamaiyas to work on his 
large landholdings. These form the basis of his power and create a large gap in status between 
the kamaiya and the jamindar. Whereas the relationship between a kisan and a kamaiya may 
be seen a voluntary contract from which both parties benefit, the relationship between the 
jamindar and the kamaiya is based on a good deal of coercion.  
 
Nepal is a Hindu kingdom, and people’s social position and occupation are defined by caste. 
Tharus were defined in the legal code Muluki Ain in 1854 as alcohol drinking, touchable, but 
enslaveable (Holm & Løkke Rasmussen 1999:75). Although caste discrimination is 
prohibited, this ideology is deeply rooted in the population and decreases social mobility. 
Traditions hold that Tharus are related to farming and can become kamaiyas in times of 
economic difficulty. Non-Tharus would not consider becoming kamaiyas if facing the same 
difficulties, suggesting that a person’s position in the system strongly decides the person’s 
livelihood opportunities (Holm & Løkke Rasmussen 1999:75). Caste ideology is probably an 
important determinant of the livelihood opportunities of the kamaiyas.  
 
In an environment where the majority works in agriculture, land is the major production factor 
and serves as an indicator of a person’s social position within the society. Sharma (1998:33) 
states that 60% of kamaiyas do not possess any land. Those with land fall into two categories: 
those who have their own land, and those who have captured public land (Ailany), that is, 
they do not have any legal documents supporting their property claims. In 2003, 82% of the 
former kamaiya households had land, their average landholding being 5 kattha (Sharma 
2003:12). Our data also suggest 5 kattha as a median size of landholding for former kamaiyas 
and that the 25% bottom percentile has 2 kattha or less. The increased landholding among 
former kamaiyas is linked to the kamaiya land reform that took place after their emancipation 
(section 4.4.1). Ex-kamaiyas still own much less land than the general population. The median 
landholding of a former kamaiya in the random samples is 5 kattha. The overall median 
landholding in our samples is 15 kattha (table in Appendix to Chapter 4).  
 
Among all ex-kamaiyas from the random samples, 67% had loans from their landlord when 
they ended their contracts (24 observations). The median debt size was 5,000 rupees (14 
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observations).25 Sharma (1998:33) mentions that almost half of the kamaiyas were indebted 
and that the average loan size was 5,000 rupees.  
4.4 The Period since the Ban on Kamaiya Contracts  
4.4.1 The Intervention by the Government 
Already in 1996, a census was conducted by the Department of Land Reform to document the 
number of kamaiyas (Sharma 1998:30). They counted 15,152 kamaiya households, and plans 
were made and partly implemented to distribute land to these households. This census was 
heavily criticized by NGOs, who claimed the figures underestimated the number of kamaiyas. 
After the ban on bonded labor of 17 July 2000 it was therefore decided to conduct another 
survey of kamaiyas. Registration of kamaiyas took place 2–3 months following the 
declaration of 17 July. A committee consisting of representatives from the Land Reform 
Office, the district chairman and representatives from NGOs visited VDCs where there were 
kamaiyas and considered applications for kamaiya status. Their visit was announced in 
advance. Landlords had to sign a form confirming that the kamaiya had actually served as a 
kamaiya. Some of the landlords refused to sign, most likely because they had a bad 
relationship with their kamaiyas. The kamaiyas were divided into four groups. Homeless and 
landless families were grouped under category A. Families with a house and a small plot of 
unregistered land were grouped as B. Families with a house and a plot of registered land of up 
to 2 kattha were grouped as C; and families with a house and more than 2 kattha of registered 
land fell under category D. Altogether, 18,288 kamaiya households were identified through 
this process (Sharma 2003:7). The government promised to give “up to 5 kattha of land” to 
landless kamaiyas of category A and register the land for kamaiyas of category B. 
Distribution of land has taken place, but there are many still waiting while living in temporary 
camps.In 2002, NGOs urged that another registration be undertaken because it was believed 
that many kamaiyas had been left out in 2000. Another round of registration was conducted in 
2002, and approximately 14,000 new applicants claimed to be ex-kamaiyas and eligible for 
land. In the district of Kailali alone, 7,397 persons applied for land.26 However, only half of 
the applicants were granted status as kamaiyas and became entitled to receive land. Many of 
the applicants were rejected because they failed to prove their status as ex-kamaiyas. It is very 
                                                 
25 The proportion of ex-kamaiyas with debt was higher among the kamaiyas in the extra interviews and the size 
of the debt was higher.  
26 This information was obtained from the Land Reform Office, Dhangadhi, Kailali, in March 2005. 
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likely that many thought they could take advantage of the situation and saw this as an 
opportunity to get land for free. To our knowledge, none of those who were accepted as ex-
kamaiyas in 2002 have received land so far. It remains an open question whether it is possible 
to find land for them. Representatives at the Land Reform Office in Dhangadhi argued that 
there was no more land available in the area.  
4.4.2 Livelihood Strategies after the Liberation  
In recent years, kamaiyas have left their landlords in great numbers. Based on the interviews, 
it seems that the ban announced in July 2000 is the main reason for this. Table 4.7 shows that 
a large number of kamaiya contracts ended in 2000 and in subsequent years. However, a 
considerable number of kamaiyas left the kamaiya institution before the abolition in 2000, as 
many as 44% in the random samples. This figure may give the wrong impression. The real 
change in the number of kamaiya contracts is not found by looking only at how many 
kamaiya contracts are ended but also at how many workers become kamaiyas during the same 
period. Before the ban in 2000 there were workers who became kamaiyas. After 2000 very 
few became kamaiyas. Thus, the decrease in kamaiya contracts was very large after ban.  
 
Still, the data gives suggestive evidence that the kamaiya labor institution was about to 
decline before the ban was introduced in 2000. The way out of the system prior to 2000 was 
to repay the debt, which some kamaiyas obviously managed to do. This illustrates two points. 
Firstly, the change from kamaiya contracts to new labor contracts had started before 2000. 
Secondly, kamaiyas were in practice able to end the kamaiya contract. Those who changed to 
other labor contracts before 2000 typically said that they just did not want to be kamaiyas any 
longer. Few of these emphasized debt as an obstacle to ending the contract.  
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Table 4.7. Year kamaiyas ended their kamaiya contract  
Year 
Random 
sample 
Random 
sample (%) 
Extra 
interviews 
Extra interviews 
(%) 
-1990 2 8.7 0 0.0 
1991-1994 2 8.7 1 3.2 
1995 2 8.7 1 3.2 
1996 1 4.3 1 3.2 
1997 0 0.0 1 3.2 
1998 2 8.7  0 0.0 
1999 1 4.3  0 0.0 
2000 7 30.4 13 41.9 
2001 2 8.7 10 32.3 
2002 1 4.3 2 6.5 
2003 1 4.3  0 0.0 
2004 2 8.7 2 6.5 
Total 23 100 31 100 
Contracts ended 
prior to 2000 10 44% 4 13% 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
 
 
The declaration of 2000 stated that the kamaiyas were not obliged to pay their debt. Debt no 
longer tied them to their landlord. The landlords were angry at losing their financial claims, 
but in general accepted the cancellation of the debt. We found that half of the kamaiyas chose 
to repay their debt (16 observations).  
 
After the declaration some kamaiyas left immediately, while others stayed with the landlord 
for some years. Many highlighted the sense of insecurity they felt at that time, lacking both 
house and land. An overview of their strategies is given in Table 4.8. Table 4.9 shows what 
kind of labor contracts former kamaiyas are engaged in now. Around 41% of the ex-kamaiyas 
from the random samples now work as sharecroppers. The rest work as casual laborers in the 
agricultural or urban sector.  
 
Table 4.8. Strategies for liberated kamaiyas 
• Worked one or two years for the same landlord, but are now casual workers. 
Many were allowed to stay in the same house as when they were kamaiyas. 
Later on, they moved to camps or received a small land plot from the 
government. 
• Rented a place in a nearby city and worked as casual laborers. 
• Moved to temporary camps and worked as casual laborers. Many still live in 
these camps.  
• Moved to temporary camps and later moved to a plot of land provided by the 
government. 
• Stayed in their own house and went for casual work either in agriculture or 
other unskilled industrial work. 
• Are still kamaiyas (few). 
• Were offered sharecropping on a 50–50 basis by the previous landlords  
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
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Our data seem to indicate that the kamaiyas’ dominant strategies right after the abolition were 
to work for the same landlord for a couple of years as causal workers or to do casual work and 
live in their own home. Many also started to work as sharecroppers for the same landlord. 
 
Table 4.9. Occupation and landholding of liberated kamaiyas 
 
Random 
sample 
Random 
sample (%) 
Extra 
interviews 
Extra 
interviews (%) 
Sharecropping* 11 40.7 4 11.8
Casual labor – agricultural sector  3 11.1 3 8.8
Casual labor – non-agricultural sector 4 14.8 8 23.5
Casual labor – both sectors 8 29.6 18 52.9
Other 1 3.7 1 2.9
Total 27 100 34 100
  
Median land given to sharecroppers 60 kattha    27.5 kattha   
* Sharecroppers very often do casual work as well. 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
 
We asked the ex-kamaiyas which, out of the three following employment alternatives, they 
preferred: casual labor, sharecropping (equal division of output) or a kamaiya contract. The 
answer is shown in Table 4.10.  
 
Table 4.10 Preferences of labor contract among former kamaiyas 
 Yes No Indifferent Total Obs. 
Is a kamaiya contract better than casual work? 37.5% 50% 12.5% 100% 32 
Is a kamaiya contract better than sharecropping? 12.9% 87.1% 0% 100% 31 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
The answers are based on respondents from both the random samples and the extra interviews. 
 
Sharecropping was clearly the most popular labor contract, preferred to kamaiya contracts by 
87% of the respondents. Opinion among the respondents seems to be less clear on whether 
casual work is better than a kamaiya contract. Half of the respondents thought casual work 
was better, whereas 38% thought the opposite. The rest were indifferent between the two 
options. These findings should be taken with a pinch of salt. For example, some respondents 
might have misunderstood the question and thought they were supposed to compare having 
casual work every day and being kamaiya.  
4.4.3 Ex-kamaiyas’ Evaluation of their Present Situation 
We asked the ex-kamaiyas to list the advantages and disadvantages of the kamaiya system. 
The answer is shown in Table 4.11. We also asked them to compare the life they had when 
they were kamaiyas to their lives after their emancipation. Their perspectives are listed in 
Table 4.12. Many ex-kamaiyas emphasized that they now worked fewer hours and greatly 
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valued having time off. Activities such as washing clothes and taking care of their personal 
hygiene were given more time. Although not many kamaiyas are left, we found some, and we 
asked them why they were still kamaiyas.  
 
Table 4.11. Former kamaiyas’ evaluation of the kamaiya system 
Advantages 
• Got loan 
• Easy to get enough food and medicine 
 
Disadvantages 
• Worked a lot 
• The landlord often got very angry 
• The landlord always wanted to know the kamaiya’s whereabouts 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
 
Table 4.12. Evaluation of the post-kamaiya era 
Ex-kamaiyas’ evaluation of their present situation as opposed to when they were kamaiyas 
Advantages 
• More leisure time now 
• More time for personal hygiene and washing clothes 
• Freedom to work when and where he wants 
• Higher wage 
• Do not work so hard now 
• A feeling of being freer 
• Can cultivate his own land, does not have to work for others 
• The satisfaction of deciding how to spend his own time 
 
Disadvantages 
• Not enough food 
• Difficult to get loans 
Answers in bold were most common. 
Source: Field Survey, February-March 2005. 
 
4.4.4 Perspectives from Present Kamaiyas  
Although not many, some kamaiyas are still left. One of them, Bhagi Ram Tharu, who 
became a kamaiya as a young boy, explained to us the typical motivation for continuing the 
kamaiya relationship. He is landless, and in his opinion he will not get any casual work, and if 
he does, it will only be for a few days per year at the most. He needs a guarantee that he will 
get enough casual work before he will end his kamaiya relationship. He was not present when 
the registration committee visited his VDC and missed the opportunity to apply for land. He 
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said that he does not want to be a kamaiya, but that he did not see any other options. Table 
4.13 shows other reasons why present kamaiyas still prefer this labor contract.   
 
Table 4.13. Reason for still being a kamaiya today 
• Too old to stop and find something else to do 
• Sharecropping is too difficult to manage. It is difficult to get oxen, which are required by many 
landlords if you want to be a sharecropper 
• Cannot ride a bicycle. Therefore, cannot get to town nearby to seek alternative employment 
• Being kamaiya provides a permanent income 
• Right after the emancipation, some kamaiyas did not know that there were other employment 
alternatives. They actually had to be told about this opportunity 
• Has no land and has been left out of the land reform program 
• Many children to feed 
• Did not want to take risk because there is no certainty about finding casual work 
 
4.4.5 The Landlords’ Perspectives 
Landlords generally accepted the new ban on kamaiya, even though protests were reported, 
especially in Kailali (Sharma 2001:10). The annulment of debt was especially hard to accept 
for many landlords. Most landlords have changed the working conditions of their laborers, 
and many have switched to sharecropping. Others employ casual workers when the need 
arises. Yet, there are still a few that are not frightened by the threat of punishment and employ 
kamaiyas. We did not hear about any landlords who had been given penalties for employing a 
kamaiya. A landlord who still wanted to employ kamaiyas told us it was very difficult to find 
people who wanted to work as kamaiyas. One landlord admitted that he thought it was all 
right that the kamaiyas became free and did not have to work such long hours any longer.  
 
We noted that, in general, landlords were more powerful many decades ago when one 
landlord could have very large landholdings and could hire more than 10 kamaiyas to 
cultivate his land. Just before the abolition in 2000, however, landlords usually hired one or 
two kamaiyas. The kamaiya labor institution might have started in a setting with more 
unequal land distribution. For instance, we heard stories about landlords who used to employ 
kamaiyas in large numbers on big land plots (see Rankin 1999:34-5).   
4.5 Summary 
In the kamaiya labor institution the laborer works on the farm of a landlord in exchange for a 
fixed annual payment and daily meals. The landlord also offers the kamaiya other benefits, 
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such as clothes, shelter, credit, and sometimes the landlord also covers his health expenses. 
The kamaiya works long hours, 12–13 hours per day, and has only a few days off during the 
year. During the contract period of one year, the kamaiya cannot work for others. The 
kamaiya system has an element of patronage, since the landlord has to look after the 
kamaiya’s wellbeing. The majority of the kamaiyas were paid in kind with a fixed amount of 
crop. I estimate the annual value of a typical kamaiya contract at approximately 12,000 rupees 
per year, measured in 2005 prices, with probably more than half of the value of the contract 
comprising daily meals. Some kamaiyas managed to repay their debt and escape the system 
before the ban in 2000, but most of them left the system at the time of the abolition in 2000.  
 
A majority of the former kamaiyas now work as casual laborers in either the agricultural or 
the urban sector. Our estimate is that 41% of the former kamaiyas have become 
sharecroppers. According to former kamaiyas, being a sharecropper is considered much more 
economically beneficial than being a kamaiya. However, kamaiya contracts and casual work 
are considered relatively equivalent. Former kamaiyas who are now casual workers are 
ambiguous when it comes to describing any degree of improvement in their welfare after their 
emancipation. Their income is now more uncertain and they have difficulties in finding 
sufficient casual work to get enough food for their families. By and large, the ex-kamaiyas 
who are now casual laborers conclude that their lives have improved slightly and underscore 
that their lives now involve much less work and more leisure. However, their food security 
has worsened and credit is not as easily available as before. In general, kamaiya landlords 
accepted the ban on bonded labor, and they have substituted kamaiya contracts with 
sharecropping, or cultivate the land themselves and hire casual labor when they need it.  
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
Table A.4.1 Summary statistics on landholdings, wage and labor contracts by ward, random 
samples 
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Landholding             
Landholding, max. (kattha) 134 22 120 18 100 20 240 11 80 13 150 15
Landholding, min. (kattha) 0  1 0 1 1  1
Landholding, mean 20.2  25.2 22.6 40.9 23.8  27.9
Landholding, median  9.5  10 11.75 15 15  22
25% percentile 5  3 2.5 6 2  4
75% percentile 17.5  34 30 40 30  34
Gini coefficient 0.603  0.609 0.595 0.665 0.555  0.539
     
     
Labor relations     
Number of sharecroppers  5  6 9 4 2  6
Rented land cultivated by 
sharecroppers, median 
20 5 35 6 20 9 18 4 60 2 22 6
Number of landlords renting out 
to sharecroppers 
0  1 1 - 1 1 2 2 4 4
Working for other farmers 18 
(82%) 
21 13 
(72%)
18 15 
(83%)
18 6 (55%) 11 2 (15%) 13 8 (53%) 15
Farmers hiring land workers 11 
(52%) 
22 6 (33%) 18 3 (50%) 6 4 (36%) 11 4 (33%) 12 2 (13%) 15
     
     
Agricultural wage, men     
Pay harvest season, median 65 17 60 13 70 10 60 6 100 3 70 9
Meals harvest season, median 1 15 1.5 13 2 1 2.5 5 -  -
Pay planting season, median 70 16 70 8 70 9 60 5 100 5 70 9
Planting season meals, median 1 15 1.25 8 1 2 2.75 4 -  -
     
     
     
Agricultural wage, women     
Pay harvest season, median 60 11 60 3 70 3 55 3 80 3 70 6
Meals harvest season, median 0.5 9 1.5 3 2 1 2.5 3 -  -
Pay planting season, median 60 15 60 11 70 8 55 7 80 5 70 7
Planting meals season, median 0.5 11 1 11 1,5 1 2.5 6 -  -
     
5 kattha = 135 x 135 square feet = 0.17 ha. 
100.00 rupees equals approximately £0.73 (October 2006). 
This table continues on the next page. 
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Table A.1. Summary statistics on landholdings, wage and labor contracts by ward, random 
samples (continued) 
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Landholding             
Landholding, max. (kattha) 160 19 35 18 80 20 90 17 240 184 24 23
Landholding, min. (kattha) 0 1 1 0 0  0
Landholding, mean 29.7 12.4 25.8 19.8 24.5  8.0
Landholding, median  20 10 23 12 15  5
25% percentile 6.5 5 9.5 7 5  1
75% percentile 40 18 36.5 22 30  15
Gini coefficient 0.603 0.609 0.595 0.665 0.555  0.539
    
    
Labor relations    
No. of sharecroppers - 7 3 5 48  4 4
Rented land cultivated by 
sharecroppers, median  
- 12 7 10 3 14 5 20  27.5 4
Number of landlords renting out to 
sharecroppers 
6  6 1 1 2 2 2 2 22  
Working for other farmers 5 
(26%) 
19 4 
(22%)
18 7 
(35%)
20 5 
(29%)
17 86 
(47%) 
182 25 
(68%)
37
Farmers hiring land workers 10 
(53%) 
19 7 
(39%)
18 11 
(55%)
20 6 
(35%)
17 67 
(40%) 
168 1 
(2.7%)
37
    
    
Agricultural wage, men    
Pay harvest season, median 100 11 100 10 100 5 100 7 70 94 67.5 14
Meals harvest season, median 1 9 1 7 1 5 1 3 1 60 0.75 10
Pay planting season, median 100 9 100 9 100 6 100 5 75 84 70 14
Planting season meals, median 1 9 1 7 1 6 1.25 2 1 56 1 9
    
    
    
Agricultural wage, women    
Pay harvest season, median 100 8 100 4 100 5 100 1 70 48 62.5 6
Meals harvest season, median 1 6 1.25 4 1 3 1.5 1 1 31 0.5 5
Pay planting season, median 100 8 100 6 100 5 81.25 4 70 79 65 13
Planting season meals, median 1 7 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 51 0.75 10
    
5 kattha = 135 x 135 square feet = 0.17 ha. 
100.00 rupees equals approximately £0.73 (October 2006) 
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5. Discussion of Findings 
5.1 Introduction 
At the end of the theoretical chapter, three questions were formulated: what factors explain 
the existence of kamaiya contracts; what factors cause changes in the number of kamaiya 
contracts; and has the welfare of the kamaiyas increased in response to the ban? In the 
theoretical chapter, I suggested two theoretical explanations of bonded labor institutions. One 
emphasizes that bonded labor is a voluntary agreement and the other that bonded labor is an 
involuntary agreement where the kamaiya is forced to accept bad contract terms. Implications 
of the voluntary and involuntary perspectives on kamaiya contracts were mentioned. I will 
discuss the three questions and analyze whether the data from the fieldwork support the 
implications of either the voluntary or the involuntary perspective on kamaiya contracts. 
Section 5.2 discusses what factors explain the existence of kamaiya contracts, section 5.3 
looks at what factors cause change in the proportion of kamaiya contracts, and section 5.4 
discusses whether the welfare of kamaiyas has improved in response to the ban. Section 5.5 
discusses whether there has been an increase in social surplus due to the reform. 
5.2 What Factors Explain the Existence of Kamaiya Contracts?  
5.2.1 Empirical Support for the Involuntary View of Bonded Labor 
According to the unfree perspective, the kamaiyas may have ended up in this kind of labor 
contract through debt traps designed by the employer. Support for the existence of debt traps 
in our findings is limited. In the random samples, 33% of the former kamaiyas did not have a 
loan from the last landlord they served. Thus, for these kamaiyas there were no loans that 
bonded them to their landlords. Among the former kamaiyas who had loans from their 
landlords, the median debt size was 5,000 rupees, which is approximately equal to the fixed 
monetary payment that the kamaiya received for one year’s work. The real value of the 
kamaiya contract is more than twice as high. The question is whether a loan of 5,000 rupees is 
such a high debt that it is impossible for the kamaiya to repay it. We talked to former 
kamaiyas who had managed to repay the debt and started to work under different labor 
contracts. This suggests that it was possible, even though maybe difficult, for them to save 
enough money to be able to pay their debts and leave the landlord. We asked present 
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kamaiyas why they were kamaiyas even today. They gave many reasons, but none of them 
mentioned their debt to the present landlord as a reason why they chose to be kamaiyas 
today.27 After the ban on kamaiya contracts was introduced, the kamaiyas did not have to 
repay their debt to their landlord. However, many chose to do this, which may imply that to 
repay the debt was not impossible. Even though it is hard to deny that some of the kamaiyas 
had debt that could never realistically be paid back, for a large fraction their loans to the 
landlord were most likely not an important reason why they chose to stay in the kamaiya 
relationship. I do not find any significant negative correlation between the size of the debt and 
the wage received by the kamaiya. This implies that debt most likely was not used to force the 
kamaiyas to accept a lower wage. 
 
Another aspect of the unfree perspective on bonded labor is that the worker’s decision to 
become a kamaiya is guided by the rule-based decision principle described by March. The 
workers do not choose according to classical utility maximization, but choose to become 
kamaiyas because they see this as an appropriate option that matches their identity. Is this 
perspective supported by our data? If the unfree perspective is correct, we would expect that 
the worker’s reasons for becoming kamaiya were, for example, that he saw this as a natural 
and self-evident choice or that he had not considered or was not aware of other opportunities. 
We asked the kamaiyas why they became kamaiyas in the first place (section 4.3.5). Some of 
the answers can be seen as supporting the rule-based decision making model. For instance, 
those kamaiyas who had been kamaiyas since they were kids had probably developed a strong 
identity of being kamaiya, which in turn strongly influenced their choices. We also met 
kamaiyas who expressed a sense of hopelessness that no other options were available to them 
and that being kamaiyas appeared to them to be the only possible option. One former kamaiya 
said that after the ban they had to be taught about other employment opportunities, for 
example where to find casual work. They had not been aware of this possibility before. This 
observation corresponds to a concept developed by Schaffner (1995:243), who suggests that 
the landlord deliberately tries to limit the horizon of the workers in order to pressure them to 
offer their cheap labor voluntarily (see section 2.3.6).  
 
Rankin (1999:32-3) observed two types of kamaiya. For one of them, Rana Tharus, the social 
distance between the kamaiya worker and the kamaiya landlord is small. The kamaiyas did 
                                                 
27 Of course, the debt may have become a much smaller problem for the kamaiyas after the ban. 
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not stay kamaiya forever, but moved in and out of this labor category. Being kamaiya was not 
a fixed status. We also observed that some kamaiyas paid their debt and left their landlord and 
found other employment alternatives, which seems to resemble the Rana type of kamaiya 
described by Rankin. 
 
One could argue that kamaiyas have an ethnic identity since almost all kamaiyas belong to the 
Tharu ethnic group. This identity may create peer pressure among Tharus to become 
kamaiyas. However, this argument is problematic as there are many Tharus who are not 
kamaiyas. Also, there are even examples of kamaiya landlords that are Tharus.  
 
Many of the reasons the kamaiyas gave for their choice of labor contract indicate that they 
made their choice based on a more rational decision making process. The choice of becoming 
kamaiya was their best choice in the particular circumstances they faced. For example, they 
chose to become kamaiyas because it provided a stable income, which was crucial to smooth 
consumption. The kamaiya contract provided access to credit and they did not possess any 
land and thus saw the kamaiya contract as the best solution. These reasons indicate that the 
worker made a rational calculation before he chose to become a kamaiya.  
5.2.2 Empirical Support for the Voluntary View of Bonded Labor 
According to the voluntary view on bonded labor, kamaiya contracts exist because both 
parties gain from the agreement. One potential gain is “trading” in risk where a risk neutral 
landlord offers insurance implicitly to the kamaiya through the payment scheme. Qualitative 
statements from former kamaiyas indicate that there was “trade” in risk going on. Many 
respondents told us that the market for casual labor appeared to them very risky and they were 
not sure whether they would be able to get enough food to survive if they chose casual labor 
as the income base for the household. In the kamaiya system, they were given a fixed income 
and were guaranteed enough to eat and a place to stay. Former kamaiyas who now work as 
casual laborers typically emphasized how their income was much less stable now, and that 
they sometimes struggled to get enough food. The answers seem to indicate that kamaiya 
contracts were chosen to avoid a risky income and a risky labor market. 
 
If risk preference is an important factor for choosing a kamaiya contract then a person’s 
attitude towards risk should influence whether a kamaiya contract is chosen or not. Data on 
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risk preferences are not available. However, landholding can be seen as a proxy for a person’s 
preferences towards risk. A large landholding will make a person less vulnerable to economic 
shocks and therefore have more risk neutral preferences. On the other hand, a person with a 
small land plot or no land at all would be more risk averse and more likely to choose a 
contractual arrangement that would reduce the variation of his income. Thus, the implication 
is that households with small landholdings are more likely to choose kamaiya contracts and 
vice versa. I check this hypothesis by dividing all households in the random samples into 
quartiles. The first quartile is the households with the smallest landholdings. I also divide the 
households between those that are kamaiyas now or have been in the past and those that do 
not belong to those categories. Table 5.1 shows clearly that households in the bottom quartile 
of landholdings are more likely to be or have been kamaiyas.  
 
Table 5.1. Cross-tabulations, land distribution and kamaiya or not 
  Not present/ex kamaiya present/ex kamaiya  Total
Land distribution 1 quartile 34 (21.5) 15 (57.7) 49
 2 quartile 25 (15.8) 4 (15.4) 29
 3 quartile 57 (36.1) 7 (26.9) 64
 4 quartile 42 (26.6) 0 (0) 42
Total  158 (100) 26 (100) 184 
Column percentage in brackets. 
 
However, the pattern observed in Table 5.1 might have alternative explanations than 
differences in risk preferences among the respondents. Farmers with little or no land are more 
likely to offer their labor in the labor market since they do not obtain enough revenue from 
working on their own land. Therefore, respondents with low holdings of land are also more 
likely to become kamaiyas. The respondents’ risk preferences might be affected by other 
factors than their landholdings, for example income from non-agricultural jobs and ownership 
of small shops. Revenues from such activities might change the respondent’s risk preferences, 
but this is not captured in Table 5.1.  
 
Bardhan’s model of labor tying predicts that risk averse workers with limited access to 
alternative employment opportunities will have an incentive to enter into a tied labor 
arrangement with a risk neutral landlord if there is sufficient seasonal variation in demand for 
labor. Some predictions can be made from this model. First, remote areas where households 
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have less access to alternative employment opportunities will have more kamaiya contracts 
than areas closer to other employment opportunities. Distance to cities or other markets may 
be positively correlated with the magnitude of kamaiya contracts. Since there is more casual 
work available in cities, the demand for tied labor contracts will be less in areas close to 
markets or cities. Second, according to principal-agent theory the fixed wage contract does 
not give the tenant an incentive to provide effort. It is likely that the tenant under a fixed wage 
contract, here the kamaiya, will be considered lazy.  
 
We found that there was a variation in the wage level between the planting and harvest 
seasons. Higher wage differences between the two seasons indicate a substantial difference in 
demand for labor in the two seasons and therefore there should be more to gain from a tied 
labor arrangement for both parties. For example, if there is no seasonal variation in wage, the 
worker would have less need of a tied labor contract to smooth income. Thus, we should 
expect more kamaiya contracts in areas where there are higher seasonal differences in the 
wage levels. Empirical support for this hypothesis is mixed (see diagram 5.1). In the samples 
from Janakinagar and Durgauli the wage level is equal in both seasons but still there is a high 
proportion of former kamaiyas in the sample. The wards in Suda and Kalika seem to match 
the prediction from the hypothesis better. A potential error here is that the seasonal variation 
in wage may have been very different before the ban in 2000. Ideally, we should have data on 
seasonal wage differences when the kamaiya actually worked as kamaiyas.  
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Diagram 5.1. Scatter plot with proportion of ex-kamaiyas  
in sample and seasonal wage difference in percent 
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Those who live in areas where there are better outside options available for agricultural 
laborers should have less need for consumption smoothing and thus be less likely to choose a 
kamaiya contract. A laborer will normally have access to more job opportunities and a higher 
income that is not affected by seasonal variation if he lives near a city. Thus, people living in 
remoter areas would be more likely to be kamaiyas as their outside options are fewer. The 
data set has some variables that capture, to some extent, whether the household is situated 
near towns or cities with more work opportunities. For example, whether a household has 
access to electricity indicates how remote the household is. We also collected data on distance 
in time to the main market and local markets. Areas with high wages are also likely to have 
fewer kamaiyas as the high wage level indicates that there is more demand for labor and that 
due to the higher wage level the insurance offered in the kamaiya contract is relatively less 
important.  
 
These predictions may be examined more closely by cross-tabulation. Table 5.2 shows that 
households that have access to electricity are less likely to choose kamaiya contracts. In Table 
5.3 the households are divided into three groups according to the time they spend getting to 
their local market. The 33.3% percentile comprises those who live closest to the local market. 
The tendency is that those living close to the market are less likely to choose kamaiya 
contracts. The pattern is confirmed even if the distance to market variable is divided into 2 or 
4 categories. Similar cross-tabulations between distances to main market do not seem to 
reveal any systematic pattern on this issue. The weakness with these cross-tabulations is that 
they do not consider whether the kamaiyas have moved after they decided not to work as 
kamaiyas.  
 
Table 5.2. Crosstabulations, access to electricity and kamaiya or not 
  Not kamaiya present/ex kamaiya  Total
Electricity No 64 (43) 17 (73.9) 81 
 Yes 85 (57) 6 (26.1) 91 
Total  149 (100) 23 (100) 172 
Column percentage in brackets. 
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Table 5.3. Cross-tabulations, distance to local market and kamaiya or not 
 Not kamaiya present/ex kamaiya  Total
Distance to local market  33.3% percentile 34 (41.5) 4 (26.7) 49
 66.7% percentile 38 (46.3) 11 (73.3) 29
 100% percentile 10 (12.2) 0 (0) 10 
Total 82 (100) 15 (100) 97 
Column percentage in brackets. 
 
Diagram 5.2 shows a scatter plot between the proportion of former and present kamaiyas in 
the ward and an estimate of the general wage level for casual agricultural laborers in that 
ward. A meal is sometimes a part of the wage. I have valued a meal at 10 rupees. The scatter 
plot suggests that the higher the wage level is in the ward, the lower is the proportion of 
kamaiyas in the ward, although Durgauli is an outlier. This is suggestive evidence for the 
hypothesis that wards with better outside options (better paid casual work) had fewer 
kamaiyas. 
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Diagram 5.2. Scatter plot with proportion of ex-kamaiyas in  
sample and wage level 
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Diagram 5.3. Scatter plot with proportion of ex-kamaiyas in sample  
and gini coefficient of distribution of land 
 
In the theoretical chapter it was suggested that landlords behaving like a monopsonist might 
be an explanation for the proportion of kamaiya contracts in an area. We should then expect 
that areas with unequal distribution of land have a higher proportion of kamaiya contracts. 
The scatter plot in Diagram 5.3 provides some limited support for this explanation. The 
tendency is that more unequal land distribution in the ward leads to a higher fraction of 
kamaiya workers.  
  
The analysis above has a number of methodological weaknesses. First, the relationships 
between the variables can only be seen as suggestive. The cross-tabulations and scatter plots 
only look at the relationship between two variables. There might be another variable 
correlated with both of those two variables which is the real predictor of the proportion of 
kamaiya contracts. What I have not done in this thesis is to perform a multivariate analysis 
where we control for other variables to identify the robust factors that predict the proportion  
of kamaiya contracts in an area. The strongest conclusion I may draw from the findings above 
is that there appears to be a correlation between the factors mentioned and the proportion of 
kamaiyas in the wards. Based on theory, it is likely that the relationships are causal. 
 
Second, there are not many observations. Third, the proportion of kamaiyas in the ward is a 
figure that is five years old. This proportion is compared to present data on wages, land 
distribution and so on. These last data may have changed substantially as a consequence of 
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the ban on kamaiya contracts in 2000 and the plots and cross-tabulations may be misleading. 
Fourth, many of the kamaiyas moved to other areas following the ban in 2000. Thus, the 
proportion of kamaiya figures in the plots and tabulations above will not be matched with data 
on wage and land distribution etc. from the same geographical area. On the other hand, the 
kamaiyas have probably not moved too far from the areas where they used to serve their 
landlords.  
 
According to the screening theory, the workers who enter tied labor arrangements should be 
those with lowest entrepreneurial skills. This cannot really be tested, since information on 
entrepreneurial skills is not available in the data we gathered.  
 
A final argument that supports the voluntary view of the kamaiya contract is the frequent 
change of landlord. Many kamaiyas changed landlord every year and used this as an 
opportunity to demand better terms from the new landlord. This behavior suggests that the 
kamaiyas made rational and voluntary decisions and continually sought better options. 
 
In sum, the involuntary perspective on kamaiya contracts has some, but limited, support in our 
data. Debt traps do not seems to have been a major challenge for most of the kamaiyas. 
Although some of the kamaiyas’ verbal statements suggest that they were isolated from the 
rest of the society and not aware of other employment opportunities, I find it more convincing 
that most workers chose to become a kamaiya because it was their best available option. We 
find some suggestive quantitative support for that. In particular, the strong negative 
relationship between general wage level in an area and the proportion of kamaiyas in wards is 
striking.  
5.3 Why Did the Ban Work? 
The number of kamaiya contracts has clearly been reduced since the ban. In the random 
samples we found only 3 present kamaiyas.28 A question of interest is what may explain the 
reduction of kamaiya contracts. According to the unfree perspective on bonded labor, the 
number of kamaiya contracts may be reduced if, for example, the kamaiyas start to question 
whether being a kamaiya is an appropriate labor contract for them. If the choice of being 
kamaiya is linked to identities the kamaiyas have, a change in these identities will also change 
                                                 
28 See Appendix to chapter 5 for a formal statistical test that shows a significant reduction in kamaiyas.  
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the number of kamaiya contracts. The data we collected is not suitable for analyzing these 
questions, so we will not pay much attention to the unfree perspective in this section. 
However, it is interesting to observe that many of the NGOs working to improve the living 
conditions of kamaiyas viewed education of kamaiyas and raising awareness as an important 
element for bringing about change. Thus, many strategies for helping the kamaiyas seem to 
have been inspired by the unfree perspective on bonded labor.  
 
The voluntary perspective on bonded labor will be used to analyze what brought about a 
change in the number of kamaiya contracts. An important aspect that has been put forward in 
the theoretical literature on agrarian labor institutions is that they need to be self-enforcing. 
Economic transactions that take place in remote areas, including the agricultural sector, can 
only to a limited extent be governed by the formal legal institutions that are more effective in 
urban areas. Thus, if a ban on a specific contractual agreement is put forward, one would 
expect that rational economic agents would hardly change their behavior in response to a ban 
because violating the ban has limited consequences. A regulation has to be credible, implying 
that, for example, the landlord’s disincentive for offering kamaiya contracts is sufficiently 
large that he changes his behavior.29 So, one way to explain change in the number of kamaiya 
contracts is to investigate whether a legal intervention is credibly enforced in these areas.  
 
The other option is to explain a reduction in kamaiya contracts as a gradual change. In this 
case, a third party does not influence the change. It is the landlord or the worker who finds it 
rational to switch to other labor arrangements. For example, the workers might find better 
employment opportunities elsewhere and reject a kamaiya contract, or the bargaining power 
of the kamaiyas might change. I will first discuss the credible enforcement perspective on 
change and then the gradual change perspective.  
5.3.1 Credible Enforcement  
To illustrate how the enforcement of the ban on kamaiya contracts became credible it is 
instructive to apply game theory. Let us consider a game with two players, the landlord and 
the kamaiya, who act sequentially. In an agricultural setting with an excess of agricultural 
labor, it is reasonable to assume that the landlord is given the possibility of making the first 
move. He is in a position where he can offer take-it-or-leave contracts to the tenant. The 
                                                 
29 A change may also take place if the worker gets credible outside options. The worker may then credibly reject 
the landlord’s offer of a kamaiya contract. 
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landlord first offers the kamaiya a labor contract with a very low wage that maximizes his 
profit. Alternatively, he may offer the kamaiya another deal, which I call “other contract” and 
which will be less profitable to the landlord because his labor costs increase due to the higher 
wage offered to the worker. Following the offer from the landlord, the kamaiya refuses or 
accepts. The landlord knows the situation of the kamaiya well and offers terms that are 
slightly better than the kamaiya’s outside option, which could, for example, be casual work. 
The payoffs are listed in brackets; the first payoff is for the landlord. The payoffs are in this 
context a preferred ordering of options (ordinal scale). For simplicity, we only assume two 
options, kamaiya contract (payoff is 2 for the landlord) and other contract (payoff is 1), where 
the landlord prefers the first. The laborer’s preferences are opposite; he prefers the other 
contract (payoff is 2 for the laborer) to the kamaiya contract (payoff is 1). If the kamaiya 
refuses, no contract is made and both receive zero payoff. The solution to this game is that the 
landlord offers a kamaiya contract and the kamaiya accepts. This is the equilibrium prior to 
the ban. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1,2) 
Kamaiya 
(0,0) (2,1) 
Landlord 
Accept Refuse 
Kamaiya contract Other contract 
Figure 5.1 Model 1. Interventions for kamaiyas 
A game-theoretical perspective, kamaiya and landlord 
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To analyze the ban on kamaiya contracts in 2000, we must include a third player; the 
authorities (Fig. 5.2). The payoff of this player is listed as number three in the brackets. 
Observing the kamaiya institution, the authorities may either remain inactive or intervene 
legally by handing the landlord a fine for offering kamaiya contracts. During the 1990s, 
pressure was put on the authorities to abolish the kamaiya labor institution and in 2000 they 
did so. In the game theoretical framework, this means that the payoff for the authorities to 
intervene was higher than when they did not intervene (the payoff for the authorities is 1 as 
opposed to 0 when there is no ban). The payoff for the kamaiya is not affected by the ban and 
he is indifferent between a ban or no ban (payoff in both cases is 1). What changes this game 
is when the landlord’s payoff is reduced to 0 when the ban is introduced. If the ban is 
credible, the landlord will choose “other contract”. His profit when he offers this other 
contract is reduced, but at least he is better off than under the ban. The question is what will 
make the landlord believe that the ban will reduce his payoff to 0. By banning the kamaiya 
labor institution, it becomes a crime to offer it. A rational landlord has to consider the cost of 
the punishment and the probability of being caught (Becker 1968:177). If the expected cost is 
high enough, the landlord will offer the other contract instead of the kamaiya contract. The 
authorities said they would penalize the landlords who did not respect the ban. However, it is 
unlikely that this was the reason why the landlords stopped offering kamaiya contracts. We 
did not hear of anyone who had been prosecuted for having kamaiyas after the ban. A more 
likely explanation is that there were rumors that the authorities would redistribute land from 
the kamaiya landlords and give it to the kamaiyas (Hatlebakk 2006:20). This threat, whether 
(1,2,1) 
Kamaiya 
(0,0,0)  
Figure 5.2 Model 2. Legal Interventions for kamaiyas 
Landlord, kamaiya and authorities 
Landlord 
Accept Refuse 
Kamaiya contract Other contract 
(2,1,0) (0,1,1)
Ban No ban 
Authorities 
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real or not, was probably sufficiently credible to make the kamaiya landlords change their 
behavior quickly. The payoff for the landlord for choosing the other contract is higher (1) than 
when the authorities ban the kamaiya contract (0). Model 2 (Fig.5.2) shows the new 
equilibrium when the landlords switch to another contract in response to a credible legal 
intervention by the authorities. 
5.3.2 Gradual Change in the Number of Kamaiya Contracts  
Section 5.2 explained how factors such as differences in risk preferences between the landlord 
and the kamaiya and access to alternative income sources may explain the existence of 
kamaiya contracts in a region. A change in these explanatory factors may also change the 
number of kamaiya contracts. In contrast to the sudden change of a sudden regulation, this 
change will be gradual. The kamaiya and the landlord may have realized during the 1990s, or 
before, that other contractual agreements and labor contracts were more beneficial for both of 
them. If many landlords find other labor contracts more profitable than the kamaiya contract 
the demand for kamaiyas will decrease. Similarly, if tenants find better job opportunities 
elsewhere, the supply of kamaiyas will decrease.  
 
The kamaiyas’ reasons for choosing other contracts 
There are indications in our data that support the idea that the supply of kamaiyas has been 
reduced gradually. We talked to many former kamaiyas who during the 1990s realized that 
they did not want to work as kamaiyas any longer. This suggests that they had realized that 
they had better options and were not any longer compelled to accept a kamaiya contract. 
Holm & Løkke Rasmussen (1999:81-82) suggest that kamaiyas started to question whether 
their labor services were reasonably balanced by what they received from the landlord. Many 
of the kamaiyas thought that they had to give up too much of their time for labor and would 
prefer to base their income on other sources. The kamaiyas in general found that the landlord 
lived up to the expectations of a fair landlord, but the system as such was to some extent 
perceived as exploitative.  
 
In the random samples, 44% of the former kamaiyas we encountered left their kamaiya 
landlord and changed to another labor arrangement prior to the liberation in 2000 (see Table 
4.7). This figure is confusing as it does not take into account the influx of workers into the 
kamaiya system. However, based on our data it seems reasonable to conclude that the number 
of kamaiya contracts had already started to decrease before the ban in 2000. A gradual 
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reduction in a tied labor arrangement is similar to what has been observed in India (Lanjouw 
& Stern 1998:435). 
 
There was a tendency for kamaiyas to change landlord more often during the 1990s. A 
kamaiya who wants to change landlord does so most likely because he is not satisfied with the 
conditions offered. If the kamaiya changes very often, it may indicate that he is increasingly 
dissatisfied with the labor contract and is constantly seeking better conditions with a new 
landlord. On the contrary, a kamaiya who stay years and years with the same landlord does so 
because he considers the working conditions as legitimate or has no better option.  
 
The landlords’ reasons for choosing other contracts  
During the 1990s landlords may have started to realize that other labor arrangements could be 
just as profitable as the kamaiya labor contract. A kamaiya contract is the most preferred 
contract from the landlord’s point of view due to the low wage costs. However, this labor 
contract is problematic as the kamaiya has little incentive for work effort. Thus, the landlord 
has to spend resources on supervision of the kamaiya’s work effort. Respondents in our 
samples sometimes told us that kamaiyas were often accused of being lazy, which may have 
provoked the landlord to behave in a violent manner to get them to work harder. This makes 
sense from a theoretical point of view since receiving a fixed wage does not provide 
incentives for work effort. By shifting to sharecropping, in theory these problems ought to be 
less severe because the worker has more incentive to contribute work effort. A sharecropper 
will receive more payment if he works harder and will therefore have incentives for work 
effort, enabling a decrease in the cost of monitoring. The landlord’s choice of a fixed wage 
contract or sharecropping represents a trade-off between profit and supervision cost.  
 
Our data cannot show precisely whether the kamaiyas got better outside options or whether 
monitoring costs increased during the 1990s. However, the fact that the transition went so fast 
and smoothly indicates that the two alternatives were not that far from each other in value, 
from the landlords’ point of view.  
5.3.3 Historical Examples of Disintegration of Permanent Labor Institutions  
The Hali system in South Gujarat, India, in the 1960s has many similarities to the kamaiya 
system. This system gradually disintegrated in one or two decades, before and after the 
Second World War. Less willingness to employ attached labor may be explained by several 
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factors, as discussed by Breman (1974). First, Breman suggests that a change to a crop system 
that was less labor-intensive decreased the incentive for the landlords to have attached labor. 
It was more profitable to hire labor when needed (Breman 1974: 75). Second, with increasing 
employment opportunities outside the village, servitude was becoming a less popular option 
for the workers. The attachment to one landlord was a way to secure a minimum income. 
However, with increasing wages from other places, this need was no longer important 
(Breman 1974:75-6). Seasonal migration also contributed to better income security and less 
need for the income security offered by the landlord.  
 
The Dublas (bonded labor) began to feel that complete dependence on the master, 
which they formerly accepted as security, was a heavy burden (Breman 1974:76). 
 
Furthermore, Breman describes a depersonalization of the relationship between the landlord 
and the tenant. To a larger extent they saw themselves as parties with conflicting interests. 
The benefits were no longer paid as an “obligation” of the landlord, but increasingly as a 
monetary wage in a capitalist system (Breman 1976:220). The system of servitude was 
substituted with a system of casual labor. The former patrons now minimized the previous 
obligations they had as patrons, and Breman concludes: “The risk of subsistence has been 
shifted on to the agricultural laborers” (Breman 1976: 226).  
 
Platteau (1994) refers to an example of how a bonded labor system in Japan was dissolved. 
Increased employment alternatives outside the village put the nago (bonded laborer) in a 
better bargaining position. The landlord had to offer him a tenancy contract, which led to 
economic progress for the nago. Sharecropping became the dominant institution before it was 
gradually surpassed by fixed rent tenancy, when yearning and wages were sufficiently high to 
enable the peasant to cope with a higher degree of risk (Platteau 1994:9). In sum, the old 
patron-client relationship with no clearly defined exchanges of goods and labor time shifted to 
a well specified contractual arrangement with clear agreements on working hours and other 
terms. Eventually, the resources they exchanged became limited to specified quantities:  
 
… the old hierarchical and personalized oyakata-nago relationship died out and gave 
way to an entirely different relationship, much more egalitarian, and largely 
impersonal and calculative, wherein the tenant would no longer give the landowner so 
much as a day’s labor without specific compensation (Platteau 1994:10). 
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5.4 Has the Welfare of Kamaiyas Increased since the Ban?
  
5.4.1. Welfare Effects of Interventions 
This section considers whether the welfare of kamaiyas has improved since the kamaiya 
contracts were banned. The hypothesis in the theoretical chapter was that their welfare would 
decrease if kamaiya contracts were forbidden. If we assume that the kamaiya labor institution 
was the kamaiya’s optimal choice among the set of all possible strategies, excluding the 
kamaiya option from the choice set should yield a lower utility. A rational economic agent 
will choose a kamaiya contract if that is his best alternative. By denying him the possibility of 
choosing his best option, he must choose his second best option, and hence be worse off.  
 
Genicot (2002:103) points out why this is a hasty conclusion. The set of possibilities is not 
necessarily exogenously given. New choices may become available when other choices are 
excluded. For example, after the liberation of kamaiyas many landlords offered sharecropping 
contracts, which were probably better for laborers but not for the landlords, which is why an 
intervention was needed (see Hatlebakk 2006). 
 
The choice set available to the kamaiya might change if all the kamaiyas simultaneously 
refused to work as kamaiyas. Stopping one laborer from entering into a bonded labor contract 
may make him worse off, but a general ban on all bonded labor contracts may lead to a 
socially desirably outcome with higher welfare for the former bonded laborer and 
redistribution of wealth to the benefit of the same group (Conning 2005:5). There might thus 
be general equilibrium effects from a ban on kamaiya contracts. For example, sharecropping 
may also increase the wages of agricultural casual laborers, as described by Hatlebakk (2006). 
 
Basu (1999:19) makes a similar argument when it comes to banning child labor. If one child 
is taken out of the labor force, the children’s household will decrease its income. If all the 
children are withdrawn from the labor market, there will be less supply of labor and higher 
wage for the parents, making all households better off.  
 
There are two opposing factors that influence the welfare of the former kamaiya. On the one 
hand, his utility is decreased since his income is now more risky. Since the ban, the laborers 
have not been able to enter into long-term labor contracts and obtain a fixed income and 
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consumption smoothing that way. The decrease in utility due to a more uncertain income is 
supported by qualitative statements by the kamaiyas. Many told us that their income was more 
uncertain now and that they found this challenging. On the other hand, the general wage for 
casual labor may increase as a consequence of the ban on kamaiya contracts and the laborer’s 
welfare may be improved as he is better paid for his labor input.  
 
If the kamaiya is to be better off, the utility of the increased income must exceed the utility 
lost as a consequence of a more volatile income. The answer to this question depends on what 
the kamaiya has been doing since the intervention. The former kamaiyas can be divided into 
two groups, those who are employed in a sharecropping arrangement and those who work as 
casual laborers, either in the urban or the rural areas. A likely difference between these two 
groups of workers is that they differ in terms of the quality of their labor input. The kamaiya 
landlords gained knowledge about the quality of their workers’ labor efforts through their 
daily interactions with the kamaiyas. After the reform, the landlord would thus be able to 
screen the workers and hire the most skilled workers and offer them sharecropping contracts. 
The most skilled workers would also prefer a more risky sharecropping contract to a fixed 
rent contract, as argued by Hallagan (see section 2.3.5). I will discuss the welfare 
improvements for each group in turn.  
5.4.2. From Kamaiya to Casual Laborer 
In the random samples, 11% of the former kamaiyas do casual work only in the agricultural 
sector, 15% do casual work only in the non-agricultural sector and 30% do casual work in 
both sectors (see Table 4.9). Whether the welfare of these casual laborers has improved is 
difficult to assess. This group of former kamaiyas bases their income on revenues from an 
unpredictable market for casual labor. Their income is much more volatile compared to when 
they were kamaiyas. A kamaiya contract was worth approximately 12,000 rupees per year. A 
typical wage for a casual worker was 70 rupees per day. This means that a kamaiya has to find 
casual work for at least 171 days to get the same annual income as before. In fact, since the 
kamaiya is assumed to be risk averse he must find casual work for more days.  
 
When asked to compare a kamaiya contract and casual work, approximately 50% of the 
former kamaiyas considered casual work better, 38% preferred a kamaiya contract and the 
rest were indifferent between the two options. These answers indicate that the two options, 
kamaiya contract and working as casual laborers, are considered relatively equivalent in terms 
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of utility. This matches well with the theoretical prediction from Bardhan’s model and 
principal-agent theory: the landlord will only offer kamaiya contracts that are equal to or 
slightly better than the kamaiya’s outside option. Thus, the kamaiyas should be more or less 
indifferent between choosing a kamaiya contract or casual labor, which the data seem to 
confirm.  
 
The utility of the kamaiya in this category might be increased if the wage level for casual 
labor increases due to a general equilibrium effect, as described above. Hatlebakk (2006) 
builds a model in which the bonded labor’s outside option is endogenously determined by the 
landlord. In other words, the landlord is able to reduce the casual wage level in the village, 
which is the outside option for a bonded laborer. If the landlord offers sharecropping instead 
of permanent labor contracts, the casual wage level within the village will increase. The 
landlord’s surplus is maximized when he offers permanent labor contracts, but sharecropping 
is more efficient. When the ban was introduced, what happened was that the permanent 
workers were given an exogenous and better outside option that the landlord could not 
manipulate. The prediction from this model is that the casual wage level should be lower in 
areas where there were many permanent workers before the ban. Also, we would expect that 
the casual wage in villages with many permanent workers will be equalized to other 
comparable villages after ban. Hatlebakk finds empirical support for both predictions. 
 
There is another way to test this idea by using our data. If we assume that the kamaiya 
contract is approximately equivalent to the expected annual wage the kamaiya may get in the 
market for casual labor, the value of the kamaiya contract is an indirect way of measuring the 
casual wage level. One could argue that the kamaiya contract mirrors how good the kamaiyas’ 
outside options are (casual labor). In 2000, the median fixed annual payment received by 
kamaiyas was 4,973 rupees (16 observations), whereas the payment received by present 
kamaiyas we met in 2005 was 7,228 rupees (6 observations). This is a 45% increase in 5 
years. The total inflation during these years was 5%, which suggest an increase in real terms 
of 40% in the value of the fixed payment under a kamaiya contract.30  
 
Hatlebakk (2006:23-4) estimates the wage level in kamaiya villages at the time of liberation 
and suggests 54 rupees. This wage is much lower than the daily wage level in villages not 
                                                 
30 I use the same inflation data as in footnote 19. The price of rice increased by 1% per year on average from 
2000 to 2003.  
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dominated by kamaiyas. The median daily wage level in the districts we covered was 80 
rupees according to the Nepali Living Standard Survey in 2003/04. After the ban in 2000, the 
casual wage level in kamaiya villages should be similar to the casual wage level in non-
kamaiya villages.31 The increase from 2000 to 2003/04 in the daily wage was 37%32 in the 
villages dominated by kamaiyas. This estimate is close to the percentage estimate of the 
increase in value of the kamaiya contract for approximately the same period. The similarity 
between the two estimates, the increase in the fixed pay for kamaiya contracts and the 
increase in the casual wage level, suggests that the utility equivalence between a kamaiya 
contract and the daily wage rate remains even after the liberation and that the wage increase 
for kamaiyas has been higher in per cent than the growth of the casual wage level in villages 
with few kamaiyas. In other words, if the utility equivalence between the casual labor and 
kamaiya contracts is correct, the wage level – both the casual wage and the fixed kamaiya 
wage – has increased more in villages previously dominated by kamaiyas compared to 
villages with fewer kamaiyas.  
 
Another way to increase the utility of this group is to reduce the variability of their income. 
The governmental interventions contributed to a more secure income for the former kamaiya. 
The allocation of land and grants to build a house reduces the vulnerability of these 
households. Vocational training has given former kamaiyas easier access to better paid jobs in 
the cities. 
  
It is reasonable to assume that former kamaiyas differ in their vulnerability to economic 
shocks. When all the former kamaiyas face a risky income situation the most vulnerable are 
likely to face trouble if they are hit by economic shocks. Before, all the kamaiyas were given 
enough to eat and a fixed income. Now at least some of them will probably earn less than a 
critical subsistence income, which will give them economic problems. The most vulnerable 
ones might then be worse off compared to the situation when they were kamaiyas. 
5.4.3. From Kamaiya to Sharecropper 
Many former kamaiyas are now employed as sharecroppers. Our data shows that this was true 
for 41% of the former kamaiyas in the random samples and 12% of the kamaiyas in the extra 
                                                 
31 One of Hatlebakk’s hypotheses is that the daily wage level will be equal in kamaiya villages and other villages 
after the liberation.  
32 I have subtracted 3% for inflation. The increase in non-kamaiya villages is only 16.4%.  
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interviews. The land plots being cultivated by former kamaiyas, but now under a 
sharecropping arrangement, were quite large (median size 30 kattha). A sharecropper may do 
casual work when he is not busy with the land he is cultivating, either working for other 
farmers or doing casual work in the city nearby. Our data indicates that most sharecroppers 
take advantage of this opportunity. 
 
A clear majority of former kamaiyas considered sharecropping a much better contract than the 
kamaiya contract. However, there are no theoretical reasons why a sharecropper should get 
higher utility than a kamaiya laborer. A profit maximizing landlord will set the wage so that 
the participation constraint holds with equality, no matter whether it is a sharecropping 
contract or a fixed wage contract. From the discussion in 5.4.2 we conclude that the casual 
wage level most likely increased as a consequence of the reform. This is also the outside 
option for a sharecropper and thus the sharecropper should be better off.  
 
Contrary to the fixed income given to kamaiyas, sharecropping implies that the income risk is 
equally shared by the tenant and the landowner. Thus, a sharecropper has to face a risky 
income. One explanation for why some workers choose this type of contract is that they are 
less risk averse than those who prefer casual work. Also, they may be more skilled workers 
and therefore choose a contract that gives them a higher reward for their high abilities. After 
the reform, there may have been a self-selection of workers into different types of contract, as 
described in section 2.3.5. A skilled worker will prefer a contract where the reward is more 
linked to his performance, for example a sharecropping contract. He is willing to choose this 
contract as he reasons that given his high skills, it provides the most beneficial contractual 
terms for him. Less skilled workers would prefer casual work where the wage per day is fixed 
and the wage is less linked to performance.  
 
The former kamaiya landlords probably also had preferences concerning to whom they 
offered sharecropping contracts. The landlords had gained knowledge about workers’ farming 
abilities due to their previous working relationship. The landlords were capable of choosing 
the best farmers to work for them as sharecroppers. The fact that this group of workers is 
probably highly skilled and capable of handling more risk suggests that this group of former 
kamaiyas is not among the most vulnerable. This group of former kamaiyas may also take 
advantage of the opportunity to do casual work whenever they are not busy working as 
sharecroppers. 
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In sum, this group of former kamaiyas is probably better off following the intervention due to 
the increase in the wage level for casual work, even though there may be some that are worse 
off due to the random component of the sharecropping contract.  
5.5 Are there Efficiency Gains Due to the Reform? 
In an agrarian economy, resources such as labor, capital and land are utilized to produce 
output. The use and allocation of these resources are decided by the economic players in the 
economy, that is, the landlords and the laborers. The government may regulate the interaction 
between these players by making rules that all the players have to follow. These rules give 
incentives for certain actions and allocations of resources. The ban on kamaiya contracts in 
2000 introduced a new set of rules for the economic players in the agrarian economy of 
Western Terai. The reform can be seen as a success if the new rules affected the economic 
players in such a way that the available economic resources were exploited more efficiently. 
If the resources are organized in a more efficient manner, more output can be produced with 
the same amount of resources. The question is whether the reform in 2000 had such positive 
consequences and this section will explore the issue. I first describe the situation before the 
ban and then the changes that happened after the ban.  
 
Resource allocation before 2000 
L is the total labor supply the kamaiya landlords hired for agricultural production. The 
laborers differ in quality. Some are skilled (LS), others are only semi-skilled (LSS). This 
corresponds to Hallagan’s idea that workers differ in their entrepreneurial ability (see section 
2.3.5). 
 
L = LS + LSS       (1)  
 
The workers are assumed to have two possible levels of effort, E0 and E1, where E1 > E0. The 
highest effort level is achieved when the worker is paid more if he works harder. He then 
contributes with unobserved effort. The wage under a kamaiya contract is fixed, which 
implies that the kamaiya has the lowest effort level (E0). The kamaiyas are annually paid 
wage Q0 under the kamaiya regime, where kamaiya contracts are still legal. The profit Qπ is 
the annual aggregated surplus for the landlord measured in agriculture production. 
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Qπ0 = QLE0 – Q0L      (2) 
 
Resource allocation after 2000 
Under the new regime, kamaiya contracts are no longer offered by the landlord. Based on our 
data, sharecropping contracts to a large extent replaced kamaiya contracts. Some former 
kamaiya landlords also hired labor on a casual basis to replace the kamaiya workers. I also 
argue that kamaiya landlords selected the most skilled workers to work for them under the 
new sharecropping contract terms. Based on daily interactions with the kamaiyas the 
landlords should have knowledge about who are the most skilled workers and would prefer to 
hire them as sharecroppers. The annual average wage for casual workers Q1 has increased, as 
argued earlier (see section 5.4.3). Under the new regime, the landlords’ aggregated profit is: 
 
Qπ1 = QE1Ls s + QFE0Lss – Q1Lss,  (3) 
 
 
S is the share given to the landlord (1-s given to the sharecropper). F is the fraction of former 
kamaiyas who do casual work for a former kamaiya landlord. 1-F former kamaiyas do not 
work for kamaiya landlords any longer and do non-agricultural work in urban areas. 
According to our data, this last group could be approximately 15% of all former kamaiyas 
(see Fig. 4.9).  
 
What may we conclude has happened to the landlords’ aggregated profit as a consequence of 
the reform? The sharecropping arrangement should give a higher output per worker (due to 
higher E). However, the landlord only receives a share s of this production from 
sharecroppers. It is ambiguous whether this share in terms of output is higher or lower 
compared to what the landlord received under the kamaiya regime. The overall production 
may increase due to the new sharecropping arrangement (higher E) so that the landlord in fact 
Production  
from  
sharecroppers. 
Positive or 
negative 
contribution to 
aggregated profit 
of landlords 
(compared to 
before ban) 
Production from casual workers 
less their wage. Negative 
contribution to landlords’ profit 
compared to before ban since 
the wage to the workers has 
increased. 
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earns more even though the sharecroppers simultaneously receive more than they did as 
kamaiyas. However, the landlords’ profit probably decreases under the new regime. If not, 
why did they not choose sharecropping instead of kamaiya contracts before the reform if 
sharecropping was more profitable? 
 
The production from the casual workers (QFE0Lss) should use the same amount of labor 
resources as before (same E). But the wage given to the casual workers (Q1) has increased and 
the landlords’ profit from the casual laborers’ production should decrease. Hence, the 
aggregated profit to the landlords (Qπ1) could be higher or lower under the post-kamaiya 
regime than under the kamaiya regime, but is most likely lower. 
 
The former kamaiyas who now work as sharecroppers receive QE1Ls(1-s) as their 
remuneration. Based on the subjective evaluation (see Table 4.10), I find it very likely that 
sharecropping is more profitable than the contractual terms under the kamaiya contract, as 
argued earlier. Additionally, the former kamaiyas who work as sharecroppers have received 
very large land plots to work on. 
 
The former kamaiyas who work as casual laborers earn Q1Lss. They should be better off since 
the wage they receive is higher (Q1). However, this is only true if they find enough casual 
work so that they annually earn at least as much as a kamaiya. Many workers in this category 
supplement agricultural casual work with non-agricultural casual work. 
 
There is a third group of former kamaiyas who only do non-agricultural casual work 
((1-F)Lss.). This group may be as large as 15% of former kamaiyas. The fact that these 
workers are no longer engaged in agricultural work could have several explanations. First, 
according to economic theory a sharecropping contract is more efficient than a fixed wage 
contract. The worker works more efficiently and fewer workers are needed to work on the 
land of former kamaiya landlords. E increases from E0 to E1 under the new regime. Second, 
only skilled workers are selected to continue to work for the landlord. This fact may 
contribute to more efficient agricultural production.  
 
The existence of this group of former kamaiyas is a strong indication that the resources are 
being used more efficiently, that is, the same output (or more) is produced with fewer 
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workers. However, there is a chance that the landlord hires workers who have not previously 
been involved in the agricultural sector. The fact that many workers have now moved to cities 
implies that labor resources have been freed from the agricultural sector.  
 
Another observation that supports the idea that the economy has become more efficient is that 
many kamaiyas told us that they worked shorter hours now compared to when they were 
kamaiyas. To many, more leisure time was one of the greatest benefits of the reform. This 
means that the labor supply has decreased. However, even though the labor supply has 
decreased we observe that many of the former kamaiyas are not any longer needed in 
agricultural production and work only in the non-agricultural sector. This underscores how the 
economy has improved in terms of efficiency, most likely due to the new sharecropping 
contracts.   
 
The analysis above does not take into account how sharecroppers and casual workers now 
have to face more risk and how this affects their utility negatively. Even though agricultural 
production increases in terms of efficiency, exposing vulnerable workers to more risk 
represent a cost to society.  
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6. Policy Implications  
There may be specific reasons why a labor institution in the agricultural sector has a particular 
form (Stiglitz 1989:24). For example, the existence of long-term labor contracts may be 
rational as it provides consumption smoothing for workers. A government which wants to 
regulate and change existing labor relations must consider carefully what the purposes of the 
existing agricultural institutions are. By prohibiting one type of labor contract the government 
may cause more harm if the contract solved problems for which the government does not 
provide any alternative solutions (Bardhan 1989:7).  
 
The ban on kamaiya contracts was successful in the sense that it did reduce the number of 
kamaiya contracts. The kamaiyas left their landlords in large numbers. However, the kamaiya 
contract insured the tenant against income fluctuation. Immediately after the kamaiya contract 
was banned the government did not have alternative ways of providing the insurance the 
kamaiyas had now lost. One could argue that the kamaiya landlord provided welfare services 
to the kamaiyas. Just after the ban on kamaiya contracts, there were no indications that the 
authorities had thought of how to substitute the welfare services previously provided by the 
landlord. Later on, different programs have allocated land, given grants for house building 
and provided vocational training for the former kamaiyas (see Gurung 2004 for an overview). 
In sum, these programs have increased the outside option of the kamaiyas and should give 
them better bargaining power in negotiations with employers. The former kamaiyas that are 
now sharecroppers seem to have improved their welfare compared to before. Therefore, 
policy makers should be primarily concerned about the welfare of those former kamaiyas who 
are now casual laborers. One element here is to improve the infrastructure. Better roads 
reduce the costs for laborers seeking and finding job opportunities in cities nearby. Other 
policies would be to continue to redistribute land and to provide alternative credit sources and 
vocational training for the former kamaiyas.  
 
An interesting implication of this legal intervention is that it demonstrates that it is possible to 
regulate labor relations in an agricultural setting. The ban was credibly enforced and the 
number of kamaiyas fell quickly after 2000. Our analysis suggests that it was not the potential 
penalty for landlords offering kamaiya contracts that brought about the sudden change, but 
rather the rumors that the authorities would expropriate land from kamaiya landlords and 
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distribute it to the kamaiyas. The expectation that the expropriation might take place was 
enough to make the landlords change their behavior.  
 
Even though institutions may serve a particular function and have rational explanation, they 
may not be efficient in the sense that other institutions may replace them and generate a 
higher social surplus (Bardhan 1989:8-9). There seems to be a fair amount of evidence that 
the kamaiya labor institution served a real economic purpose as it provided consumption 
smoothing and insurance for risk averse laborers. However, this does not imply that other 
labor institutions might be more efficient institutions. In Nepal, the kamaiya contracts were 
replaced by sharecropping. There are many reasons why this is a more efficient institution 
than the kamaiya system. First, sharecropping provides effort incentives for the tenant. The 
cost of monitoring and the risk of moral hazard should be reduced. Second, Hatlebakk (2006) 
argues that the landlord who offers kamaiya instead of sharecropping contracts may also pay a 
lower wage for casual laborers in equilibrium, and thus manipulate the kamaiya laborers’ 
outside option downwards. This is profitable for the landlord but not socially optimal.33 The 
ban made this maneuver more difficult for the landlord. Third, the previous kamaiya landlords 
have probably selected the kamaiyas with highest entrepreneurial input to work as 
sharecroppers for them. In other words, former kamaiyas who became sharecroppers were 
probably the best farmers. This could potentially have efficiency gains as fewer labor 
resources are used to cultivate the same amount of land. An empirical observation also 
supports this argument. Former kamaiyas who now work as sharecroppers (from the random 
sample) have been given a median landholding of 60 kattha (see Table 4.9). The overall 
median landholding for sharecroppers is only 20 kattha (table in Appendix to chapter 4). The 
large landholding given to former kamaiyas signals that they are considered skilful workers. 
To make agricultural production even more efficient, theory suggests that sharecropping 
should be replaced by fixed rent tenancy. This gives the maximum incentives for effort from 
the tenant and generates higher overall agricultural production.  
                                                 
33 See Hatlebakk (2006) for a discussion of non-credible side-payments. 
 95
7. Conclusion 
This thesis has examined a reform to abolish the kamaiya labor system in southwestern Nepal. 
In this system, workers tie their labor to a landlord for one year. In return, they receive a fixed 
annual income and other benefits such as meals, housing and consumption credit. The system 
seems to share many of the characteristics of a patron-client relationship. Income smoothing 
and insurance seem to be the main motives for workers choosing this particular contract. 
Through the labor contract the kamaiya implicitly insure themselves against the risk of 
unemployment in a risky market for casual labor. This “trading” in risk is possible since the 
landlord is less risk averse than the worker. 
 
In 2000, the Nepalese government banned kamaiya contracts and threatened to penalize 
landlords who offered these contracts. The ban was successful in the sense that the number of 
kamaiya contracts was reduced significantly. Today, kamaiya contracts are rare.  
 
The former kamaiyas are now either sharecroppers or casual workers who find work in the 
agricultural or urban sectors. Both categories of former kamaiya face a more volatile income 
now compared to before. The sharecroppers now share the risk of agricultural production 
together with the landlord. By assuming more of the risk in agricultural production, they also 
have more incentive for putting in unobserved effort since their remuneration is likely to 
increase in response to higher levels of effort. The former kamaiyas perceive the 
sharecropping contracts to be much better than kamaiya contracts. In addition to the income 
from the land, a sharecropper may supplement his income by doing casual labor elsewhere. 
We found that the former kamaiyas were working fewer hours and that their new leisure time 
was greatly appreciated. Many former kamaiyas want to work under this kind of tenancy 
contract but are not able to due to a limited supply of these kinds of contract. The 
sharecropping institution is more efficient from a social point of view, as argued in chapter 5 
and 6.  
 
The other group of kamaiyas has become casual workers and they struggle to find enough 
casual work to survive. When asked to compare their new situation with being a kamaiya their 
answers are ambiguous. In terms of utility, the former kamaiyas seem to be more or less 
indifferent between these two options. Theories from labor tying predict that tied laborers will 
be slightly worse off if they can no longer choose their preferred options and have to choose 
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their second best options. Our data seem to confirm that the change in utility for this group of 
former kamaiyas is small and most of them are indifferent between the two options. Hence, 
the welfare improvement for this group is ambiguous. However, we argue that the ban has 
increased the casual wage level in villages with a high presence of kamaiyas. The ban has 
increased the outside options for the former kamaiyas and they should be better off. Whether 
this increase in wages exceeds the reduction in utility due to a more volatile income remains 
an unanswered question. 
 
Policies that aim to improve the life of former kamaiyas should be focused primarily on how 
the welfare of those who now work as casual laborers. The policies should aim to reduce the 
volatility of the income of this group. Several attempts have already been made to do this, for 
example allocation of land and vocational training. Better infrastructure can also provide 
easier access to work for these laborers. Improving access to credit would also help the former 
kamaiyas.  
 
The good long-term effect of the intervention is that kamaiyas have become much more 
integrated into the labor market. The ex-kamaiyas must now engage more actively in the labor 
market and seek work themselves. To some extent, they were excluded from the labor market 
when they worked for a landlord. Their freedom of movement was also restricted. One effect 
of the reform is that many kamaiyas have started to realize that there are alternatives to being 
a kamaiya, alternatives that at least some of them were not aware of before the intervention.  
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SUMMARY
This report investigates the welfare effects for bonded laborers (kamaiyas) in 
Western Terai of a ban on permanent labor contracts in July 2000. The ban was 
credibly enforced and within a short time the number of bonded laborers was 
reduced significantly. 
 
By and large the bonded labor institution in this region must be seen as a 
voluntary agreement whereby a risk averse worker entered into an annual labor 
contract with a risk neutral landlord. The contract provided a fixed income 
which smoothed consumption for the worker, who thereby avoided exposure to 
an unpredictable labor market for casual workers. The kamaiya worker received 
other benefits as well, such as housing, food and access to credit. However, the 
working hours for kamaiyas were very long. 
The former kamaiyas may be divided into two groups, those who have become 
sharecroppers and those who work as casual laborers. The bonded labor 
contracts have mainly been replaced by sharecropping. Both groups have 
in common that their annual income has become more volatile since 2000. 
However, I argue that both groups have become better off. The reason is that 
the ban on bonded labor has increased the wage level for casual workers in 
villages with a high presence of kamaiyas, which implies that the outside option 
of former kamaiyas has increased. I also argue that sharecropping is a more 
efficient institution than the kamaiya labor system. 
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